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Abstract 
This dissertation examines firms’ human capital (HC) augmentation strategies and under 
what conditions firms can generate competitive advantages from these strategies. I investigate 
the two main ways firms augment their HC: building and acquiring. I seek to advance this 
important, but understudied, area of research in the strategic HC literature by explaining how and 
when, as well as with what performance effects, firms engage in each of these strategies. The 
first question addresses how firms generate economic returns from building and acquiring 
strategies. The second question investigates the antecedents to firms’ choices to invest in 
building rather than acquiring strategies. Finally, the third question examines the effects of the 
business cycle on firms’ capabilities to generate economic returns from building and acquiring 
strategies. I find that firms can create value from their HC augmentation strategies if they can 
also use their capabilities to overcome the four classic problems across the business cycle, and 
can invest in long-term building strategies. To conduct my analyses, I use a longitudinal dataset 
that I constructed by combining several secondary data sources on the largest U.S. law firms 
over the last decade.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Firms often invest in attracting, retaining, and motivating employees through the strategic 
management of human capital (HC), defined broadly as knowledge, skills, and abilities of 
individuals (Coff & Kryscynski, 2011; Mayer, Somaya, & Williamson, 2012; Wang, He, & 
Mahoney, 2009; Wang & Lim, 2008). The first step to generating value from HC is to 
understand the effects of firms’ augmentation strategies, i.e., how firms bring in HC. Managers 
from some of the most successful firms, such as General Electric, Google, and Nucor, typically 
choose to focus their time disproportionately on augmenting with the best available HC in order 
to generate positive NPVs (O'Callahan, 2011).  
This dissertation focuses on the two main HC augmentation strategies: (1) building and 
(2) acquiring (Cappelli, 2008; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). Firms that pursue a building strategy 
typically hire novice employees and then train and develop these employees to enhance their 
expertise and productivity in the firm over time. Alternatively, firms that pursue an acquiring 
strategy hire trained employees from other firms, who can be immediately productive for the 
hiring firm. The purpose of this dissertation is to explain and predict how firms decide between 
and generate economic returns from the strategies of building and acquiring.  
General Electric often pursues building strategies because the firm hires inexperienced 
employees and channels them through numerous leadership programs to develop their 
employees’ technical and managerial knowledge (Knudson, 2006). By contrast, Heidrick & 
Struggles, a prominent executive search firm, often entices experienced employees from 
competing boutique firms, which is an example of using an acquiring strategy (Lublin, 2011). 
While these examples relate to firms that focused on one augmentation strategy, the “modern 
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approach to talent demand involves striking a balance” between building and acquiring in a way 
that reduces costs and creates economic value (Cappelli, 2008:13).  
Firms typically engage in and manage both augmentation strategies—building and 
acquiring—often in concert. According to a 2011 survey of 277 low- and mid-level managers at 
firms that received federal funding to grow their stock of HC, 48.6% of the funds were used to 
build HC and 47.3% of the funds were used to acquire HC (Jones & Rothschild, 2011). This 
dissertation analyzes three key questions surrounding a firm’s augmentation strategies: how a 
firm generates value from both building and acquiring, when a firm decides to invest in building 
versus acquiring, and how a firm generates value from augmenting across the business cycle.  
I empirically test my research questions about the alternate strategies of building and 
acquiring in the context of large U.S. law firms, which is a well-suited context to study my 
research questions.1 First, the experience and expertise of employees compose the crucial inputs 
that generate legal advice sold to clients; in short, HC is the sine qua non of law and other 
service-providing firms. Second, law and other service-providing firms form hiring committees 
dedicated to actively pursuing elite law firm associates through both HC augmentation strategies, 
and clearly consider these activities to be strategically important for their success (Ginsburg & 
Wolf, 2004; Manch, 2000).  
Third, large law firms voluntarily break down their hiring of attorneys, which provides a 
rich source of valuable secondary data in order to measure and test HC strategies. These firms 
report the kind of data that allows me to differentiate between the building and acquiring of 
employees (associates) as well as managers (partners). HC in the following chapters refers to 
1 See Appendix A for an analysis of building and acquiring strategies in the legal industry. See Appendix B for a 
detailed description of how I constructed the dataset.  
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employees rather than managers, since managers are collectively the decision-makers in a firm 
and may impact firm capabilities. Essentially, I am able to track how a particular law firm 
engages in building and acquiring strategies, and changes these strategies over time. The 
generalizability of the first two factors listed above to other service-providing firms and the 
abundant availability of data make law firms an attractive context to conduct my study. 
Chapter 2 focuses on how a firm can increase its economic returns using the strategies of 
building and acquiring. While it may seem intuitive to begin the discussion with the antecedents 
to augmentation (i.e., Chapter 3), the more immediate question managers face is how to generate 
value from augmentation (i.e., Chapter 2). I identify four “classic” problems that firms may need 
to address—quality uncertainty, firm-specific HC, team complementarities, and employee 
motivation—before they can generate value from building and acquiring strategies. I hypothesize 
firm capabilities that can reduce one or more of these problems in order for firms to subsequently 
generate economic returns from augmentation. Based on a sample of 148 law firms from 2003-
2011, the results indicate that an employee’s chances for promotion inside the firm positively 
moderate both a building and an acquiring strategy. In addition, a firm’s building strategy is 
more effective when the firm has a stronger reputation and prior building experience. A firm that 
pursues an acquiring strategy can generate economic returns when the firm brings in external 
leaders and possesses prior acquiring experience. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the conditions under which firms choose to invest in building 
strategies. The two drivers of building strategies are the capability to provide mentorship and the 
capability to pursue long-horizon investments. I hypothesize that firms that have managerial 
slack who can provide mentorship, and firms that possess financial slack in order to pursue long-
horizon investments are more likely to invest in building. Firms that cannot pursue mentorship or 
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long-horizon investments, e.g., if they are bringing in external leaders or facing turnover shocks, 
are more likely to pursue acquiring strategies. Based on a sample of 148 law firms from 2003-
2010, I find strong statistical support for firms’ capabilities to invest in building due to 
managerial slack and financial slack, but do not find statistical support for firms’ decision to 
acquire. 
Chapter 4 explores the impact of the business cycle on how building and acquiring 
strategies can generate economic returns. The business cycle manifests itself through employee 
search frictions, defined as the balance between employee confidence about, and barriers to, 
searching for and securing another job. When employee search frictions are high, usually 
characteristic of contraction stages, the four classic problems are less of an issue since employees 
have less bargaining power due to diminished mobility options. When employee search frictions 
are low, by contrast, the four classic problems are more impactful and firms may need to address 
them more concertedly because employees have increased options to select more potentially 
desirable employment opportunities. The results support these claims in that firms that pursue 
HC augmentation strategies in contraction stages can generate economic returns without using 
their capabilities. However, during expansion stages, firms cannot generate economic returns 
unless they use their capabilities and address the classic problems. 
There are several contributions of this dissertation. First, the strategic HC literature has 
explained the importance of generating a competitive advantage from HC augmentation 
strategies, but has so far understudied how firms decide between and generate value from these 
strategies (Campbell, Coff, & Kryscynski., 2012; Lepak & Snell, 1999; Ployhart, van Iddekinge, 
& MacKenzie, 2011; Wright & McMahan, 2011). This dissertation contributes to this area by 
focusing on how firms generate a competitive advantage from two HC augmentation strategies—
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building and acquiring—which are also important phenomena. Given the near parity of these 
strategies (Jones & Rothschild, 2011), managers may need to constantly decide which one 
strategy to pursue at a given time. Since firms are augmenting by pursuing building and 
acquiring strategies to virtually equal degrees, this chapter’s findings are relevant and timely to 
firms. 
Second, I contribute to the growing conversation about augmentation strategies by 
identifying the mechanisms and problems that can help us distinguish between and understand 
how firms generate value from building and acquiring; this is consistent with the objectives of 
prior research that seeks to understand the micro-foundations of HC (Campbell, et al., 2012; 
Coff & Kryscynski, 2011; Gambardella, Panico, & Valentini, 2013; Ployhart & Moliterno, 2011; 
Ployhart, Nyberg, Reilly, & Maltarich, 2014). This dissertation also answers the call for more 
research studies and empirical tests that address the nuances among different augmentation 
strategies (Lepak & Snell, 1999). 
Third, this dissertation contributes to the literature by measuring and testing HC 
augmentation, which has been an empirical challenge (Wright & McMahan, 2011). First, the 
data necessary to measure our theoretical constructs are often unavailable, thus requiring time-
intensive longitudinal surveys to be conducted. I constructed a dataset by joining several existing 
longitudinal surveys that allowed me to establish a proxy for HC augmentation and to test my 
hypotheses on these strategies (see Appendix B for a detailed description of how I constructed 
the dataset). I also empirically differentiate the effect of these building and acquiring strategies 
on performance, since their effect resides on different timelines (Pacheco de Almeida, 
Henderson, & Cool, 2008). Finally, I unravel the different types of HC inside firms, and can thus 
focus on the building and acquiring of employees (instead of managers or other types of HC).  
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While this dissertation has addressed many of the theoretical and empirical challenges of 
understanding building and acquiring strategies, the investigation is far from complete, though 
my early work provides a path for future studies on strategic HC to follow. For example, with the 
recent hiring of managing partners with non-law backgrounds into law firms, HC augmentation 
can inform research concerning the factors firms are likely to face under the direction of such 
external corporate leaders. Additionally, it is also critical to draw on the insights I gained from 
my conversations and interviews with managers from law firms and other professions to underlie 
a qualitative analysis of HC augmentation strategies and additional quantitative analyses, which 
is another possible way to extend the work done in this dissertation. 
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Chapter 2: How Do Firms Augment their Talent? 
A Comparative Performance Assessment of Building and Acquiring 
Introduction 
Firms mainly follow the strategies of building and acquiring when augmenting their 
existing HC. While these two strategies have the potential to generate above-normal economic 
returns (Crook, Todd, Combs, Woehr, & Ketchen, 2011; Hatch & Dyer, 2004; Hitt, Bierman, 
Shimizu, & Kochhar, 2001; Kor & Leblebici, 2005; Menon & Pfeffer, 2003), how do firms 
realize these economic returns? The focus of this chapter is to provide a firm-level comparative 
performance assessment of the dual augmentation strategies of building and acquiring to 
determine under what circumstances these HC augmentation strategies increase a firm’s 
economic returns. 
To address questions about these alternative strategies for augmenting HC in a firm, I 
draw on Makadok’s (2001) mathematical model about rent generation, which is based on a 
synthesis of the resource-based and dynamic capability views of seeking above-normal economic 
returns. Makadok’s (2001) model describes two causal mechanisms that drive how firms 
generate above-normal economic returns from their resources: capability building and resource 
picking. Under a capability-building strategy, a firm designs and constructs an organizational 
system to enhance the productivity of its resources (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). Under a resource-
picking strategy, a firm purchases outside resources for less than their marginal productivity 
when used in combination with the firm’s existing resources (Barney, 1986). 
While the HC strategies of building and acquiring can be broadly mapped onto 
Makadok’s (2001) categories of capability building and resource picking, respectively, the 
concordance between these empirical phenomena and Makadok’s (2001) theoretical constructs is 
7
not perfect.2 When firms pursue a building strategy, they may invest significantly in training, 
mentorship, and job rotation, among other programs, as part of a system that essentially mirrors a 
capability-building approach. However, these firms must also recruit raw HC with basic skills 
and learning ability as inputs into a successful development program. For example, a law firm 
may spend up to $250,000 in a two-year recruiting process3 with only a 28% chance that a 
potential entry-level associate will ultimately accept a full-time position at this firm as opposed 
to competing law firms (Goldberg, 2007).  
Similarly, when firms pursue an acquiring strategy, they search for, bid on, and secure 
commitments from experienced and immediately valuable HC, which reflects a resource-picking 
approach. However, to leverage complementarities between the experienced HC and the firm’s 
existing resources, firms may need to integrate seasoned employees into their established 
routines and culture, and further develop their skills and expertise for the longer run. Therefore, 
while building and acquiring largely correspond to capability building and resource picking, 
respectively, a building strategy may have some elements of resource picking, and an acquiring 
strategy may have some elements of capability building. Based on this and other more nuanced 
understandings of HC (Coff, 1997), I examine the underlying mechanisms that enable firms to 
generate above-normal economic returns from building and acquiring strategies. 
Firms need to address at least four essential HC-related problems in order to generate 
economic returns from their augmentation strategy: quality uncertainty, firm-specific HC, team 
2 Coff (1997) discusses the problems of using the term “resource” to describe HC, which is critical to deriving some 
of my four classic problems, however, the concordance issue described here is different from this discussion in Coff 
(1997).  
3According to recruiting partners and legal consultants at the top 200 law firms as listed in the American Lawyer, 
the cost to recruit an associate through a summer track program is largely accounted for by the opportunity costs of a 
recruiting partner’s time as well as the recruit’s travel, lodging, and meal expenses. 
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complementarities, and employee motivation.4 The problem of quality uncertainty in HC is the 
difficulty of firms to accurately perceive an employee’s quality attributes, which determine his or 
her potential for current and future productivity, prior to hiring that employee (Akerlof, 1970; 
Arrow, 1974). After hiring the employee, firms need to resolve the problem of inducing these 
employees to invest in firm-specific HC, such as developing knowledge about the firm’s unique 
systems, customer-specific needs, and standard operating procedures (Mahoney & Pandian, 
1992; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). Such firm-specific HC is frequently described as an important 
source of sustainable competitive advantage for firms (Barney & Wright, 1998; Wang, et al., 
2009).  
In addition, firms often create teams of employees who can work well together, and in 
which employees can deploy their respective expertise and skills in a complementary manner 
(Groysberg & Lee, 2009; Hackman, 2002). Firms also need to motivate HC to work diligently in 
pursuit of the firm’s overall goals, which can be accomplished by putting in place an appropriate 
system for measuring employees’ productivity and by providing them with the associated 
monetary and non-monetary (e.g., higher quality work and social recognition) incentives (Baker, 
Jensen, & Murphy, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1985). Each of these four classic problems has different 
implications for building and acquiring strategies and is thus addressed in different ways. 
Drawing on these challenges for firms, I develop and test a set of hypotheses about the 
conditions under which the alternate strategies of building and acquiring generate above-normal 
economic returns for large U.S. law firms. The results indicate that when firms pursue building 
strategies, their reputations, promotion chances, and building experience positively impact their 
4 See Table 2.1 for more details of the differences between building and acquiring strategies, specifically about how 
these four classic problems manifest in each of these strategies. 
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economic returns from pursuing these HC strategies, generating an average increase of 1.5% in 
return on sales.5 When firms pursue acquiring strategies, their external leadership, promotion 
chances, and acquiring experience positively impact their return on sales by 0.5%.  
The core contribution of this chapter is to extend the research on strategic HC. I identify 
four problems—quality uncertainty, firm-specific HC, team complementarities, and employee 
motivation—that can clearly differentiate building and acquiring strategies, and thus help firms 
understand the extent of each problem that needs to be addressed. This problem-focused 
approach aligns with the current strategy literature (Mahoney & Qian, 2013) that seeks to 
understand the underlying mechanisms explaining how firms can generate value from their HC 
(Campbell, et al., 2012; Coff & Kryscynski, 2011; Gambardella, et al., 2013; Ployhart & 
Moliterno, 2011; Ployhart, et al., 2014). In the next sections, I provide a review of the literature, 
explain the four classic problems, derive and test my hypotheses regarding building and 
acquiring, and, lastly, I close with a discussion of my results and conclusions. 
Literature Review 
While the extant literature on strategic HC focuses mostly on leveraging HC in a manner 
that improves firm performance (Hatch & Dyer, 2004; Hitt, et al., 2001; Kor & Leblebici, 2005; 
Sherer, 1995), Cappelli (2008) highlights the importance of distinguishing between building and 
acquiring. Taking an operations research approach, Cappelli (2008) suggests that firms face a 
forecasting problem, i.e., it is difficult to anticipate a firm’s demand for talent. Cappelli (2008) 
adopts an approach whereby a firm’s primary strategy should be building, and it offsets any 
shortfall in talent demand by using an acquiring strategy as a secondary option. In extending 
5 Since the average revenue of a law firm in our dataset is approximately $250 million, a 1% increase in return on 
sales translates to a nontrivial increase in net income for the law firm of $2.5 million. 
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Cappelli’s (2008) approach, this chapter posits that firms can pursue either building, or 
acquiring, or they can engage in various combinations of these two distinct strategies. Also, I 
take a more holistic approach by analyzing the potential differences in the execution of these two 
strategies and evaluating their comparative effectiveness. 
The human resources (HR) literature has examined the differences between internal 
development and external recruitment, which partially align with a building and an acquiring 
strategy, respectively. However, the focus is on prescribing recommendations from an HR 
management systems perspective (Lepak & Snell, 1999, 2002; Lepak, Takeuchi, & Snell, 2003), 
and how the different HR systems can impact performance (Arthur, 1994). The systems-based 
approach suggests that HR practices, such as extensive selection, intensive training and 
development, and incentive-based pay, work in concert with one another, and are less effective 
when practiced separately. For example, Lepak and Snell (1999) draw on the resource-based 
view, suggesting that internally developed employees possess firm-specific skills that make these 
employees more rare than externally recruited employees, and therefore firms need to adjust their 
HR management system (e.g., creating a more commitment-based system) in order to be 
effective with external recruitment.  
Following from Lepak and Snell (1999), the HR literature has been increasingly focusing 
on talent management from a strategy perspective (Wright, Dunford, & Snell, 2001), drawing 
from Cappelli (2008), as well as calling for more research on how firms develop their talent pool 
and what appropriate mix of HC can lead to a sustainable competitive advantage (Collings & 
Mellahi, 2009; Thunnissen, Boselie, & Fruytier, 2013). Rynes, Orlitzky, and Bretz (1997), 
looking at the attitudes of hiring professionals, find that these professionals evaluate internally 
developed employees differently from experienced employees, who may have been unemployed 
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prior to their acquisition;6 internally developed employees were positively evaluated for their 
open-mindedness and willingness to learn, whereas experienced employees were evaluated for 
their work-related and industry-related skills. This chapter expands on the existing HR 
perspective that focuses on the differences between building employees internally and acquiring 
experienced employees (externally); in particular, this chapter expands on Lepak and Snell’s 
(1999) work with the goal of not only investigating the firm-specificity issue, but also three 
related and crucially important problems that also must be attended to so that firms can better 
understand and differentiate between building and acquiring. In addition, rather than focusing on 
a specific HR management system, this chapter focuses on broader firm-level capabilities that 
can reduce the problems and thus increase the effectiveness of each HC augmentation strategy. 
In analyzing the strategies of building and acquiring, this chapter finds it useful to draw 
from labor economics, and in particular, literature on training and raiding, which can inform the 
problems of firm-specific HC and quality uncertainty. Becker (1964) highlights the importance 
of investing in training, and notes the differences between general and specific training. Firms 
benefit from employees investing in non-transferable specific training, and employees benefit 
from higher wages and improving their market value by investing in general training. Since then, 
a number of studies have tried to determine a firm’s return on investment (ROI) from training 
programs, and the results have been mixed (Almeida & Carneiro, 2009; Bartel, 1994, 2000; 
Conti, 2005; Jones, Kalmi, & Kauhanen, 2012). This chapter posits that one of the key variables 
missing from these studies, and one that might help firms consistently find a positive ROI from 
investments in training is the problem of incentivizing employees to invest in the firm-specific 
6 If a worker is unemployed, potential employers typically perceive a high quality uncertainty problem with that 
employee. In this analysis, hiring previously unemployed workers would constitute less of an acquiring strategy, and 
more of a building strategy since these workers may need to be re-trained in the firm.  
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aspects of training (e.g., in the case of law firms, learning customized legal software, practicing 
norms or customs, forming interpersonal relationships, and developing skills and practices that 
are all specific to the law firm). 
In addition, the quality uncertainty problem associated with an acquiring strategy has 
been explained in the literature on raiding (Lazear, 1986). When two firms are equally informed 
about an experienced employee’s productivity, raiding occurs when the hiring firm offers a wage 
higher than the current firm, who chooses not to match it. The driving force of raiding is the 
complementarities between the hiring firm and employee, but successful raids can also suggest 
mistakes in the hiring firm’s evaluation of the employee (Lazear, 1986; Makadok, 2001). The 
current firm can send noisy signals to potential raiders about their employee’s abilities 
(Waldman, 1984), which exacerbates the quality uncertainty problem for the potential hiring 
firm. Following from this logic, one of the questions this chapter seeks to address is: how can a 
firm that pursues an acquiring strategy generate a competitive advantage after possibly over-
paying for the acquired employee? This can be further complicated since such acquired 
employees do not yet possess skills specific to the hiring firm and their general skills may not be 
useful to the hiring firm. In addition, this chapter joins the two labor economics streams of firm-
specific training and raiding. 
As mentioned, the four classic problems associated with these two HC augmentation 
strategies—quality uncertainty, firm-specific HC, team complementarities, and employee 
motivation—have some roots in prior literature, which has up until now looked at these problems 
in isolation from one another. For example, in executive recruiting, the hiring of internal versus 
external of CEOs is largely based on the quality uncertainty problem (Zajac, 1990). A firm that 
promotes CEOs internally generates higher performance for the firm than if it hires CEOs 
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externally, since there are fewer of Akerlof’s (1970) quality uncertainty problems between these 
internal CEOs and the board of directors. By contrast, this chapter examines a different set of 
stakeholders, employees instead of CEOs, and suggests that the quality uncertainty problem is 
more challenging to address in acquiring than in building. In addition to the problems of quality 
uncertainty and firm-specific HC, team complementarities and employee motivation also have 
some prior origins in the strategy literature (e.g., Kogut and Zander (1992) and Datta and Guthrie 
(1994), respectively). This chapter suggests it is necessary to bring these four problems together 
to assess the advantages and disadvantages of effectively pursuing HC augmentation strategies.  
Theory 
In understanding the factors that differentiate the strategies of building from acquiring, it 
is important to recognize a critical difference in the time lines over which these two strategies 
may affect firm performance (Chadwick & Dabu, 2009): building typically generates economic 
returns later than acquiring. In a building strategy, firms typically hire employees, who recently 
completed their formal education, having obtained a foundation in occupational knowledge and 
skills (Mayer, et al., 2012), but typically lacking practical knowledge and experience.7 Firms 
may spend substantial time and resources developing their novice employee’s practical 
experience in the firm’s system of mentoring, feedback, and client interaction. Attempting to 
speed up the process internally through increased spending or allocation of additional resources 
can lead to time compression diseconomies (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). By contrast, firms that 
pursue an acquiring strategy can generate economic returns upon acquisition of their HC since 
these experienced employees possess professional, occupational, and industry-specific HC 
7 Naturally, firms cannot create employees out of thin air, so the critical distinction between the building and 
acquiring strategies is the stage (of training and experience) at which the employee is brought into the firm.  
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(Mayer, et al., 2012). Essentially, the different timelines over which these two HC augmentation 
strategies can impact a firm’s economic returns may result from the different timing lags for the 
effective development and use of these two HC augmentation strategies (Pacheco de Almeida, 
Henderson, & Cool, 2008). Therefore, I incorporate these timing differences in my empirical 
approach when I measure economic returns. Specifically, I follow the received wisdom that 
firms engaging in building may usually expect to generate economic returns after two years in 
development (Cappelli, 2008:116; Kimball, 2006:23; Maister, 1993:199; Reeser, 2012:5), 
whereas firms pursuing acquiring may usually expect to generate economic returns almost 
immediately. 
Quality uncertainty 
In addition to the timing differences, the four fundamental problems described earlier 
manifest themselves differently for firms engaged in building and acquiring. First, consider 
quality uncertainty of HC. Firms that adopt a building strategy may not be able to accurately or 
fully predict whether the novice HC they initially recruit has the raw skills and talent to 
eventually become productive and succeed because these employees have no track record at 
work. However, the quality uncertainty problem for a building strategy reduces over time as a 
firm learns about its employees’ skills and abilities (Acemoglu & Pischke, 1998; Hölmstrom, 
1979). When recruiting from another firm as part of an acquiring strategy, by contrast, there is an 
adverse selection problem in that the other firm holds private information about the employee. 
Therefore, the other firm is more likely to allow a poorer performing employee to depart, and the 
recruiting firm is more likely to over pay the employee (Bidwell, 2011; Coff, 1997). Makadok’s 
(2001) resource-picking category provides some possible strategies for firms to gain a 
competitive advantage from acquiring. They can either gain private information that can help the 
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firm compete with other firms targeting and similarly valuing the same HC, or they can avoid 
acquiring altogether in order to prevent obtaining possibly sub-optimal employees.8  
Firm-specific HC 
Firms that follow a building strategy may be better able to induce employees to invest in 
firm-specific HC than firms that follow an acquiring strategy. Firms that pursue a strategy of 
building can develop the firm-specific HC of their novice employees at the same time as they 
develop the employee’s general HC in the firm’s development system, comprising of team work, 
hierarchical assignment, and critical feedback.9 Novice employees may be hesitant to invest in 
firm-specific HC since these are less valued outside the firm (Becker, 1964; Williamson, 1985), 
but firms often induce these employees to invest in firm-specific HC through different incentives 
(Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Wang, et al., 2009). For example, in professional service firms, 
promotion is characterized as an up-and-out tournament, where employees often invest in firm-
specific HC to impress their employer and stay in the competition for promotion as well as to 
avoid being dismissed (Galanter & Palay, 1991; Gilson & Mnookin, 1989; Malos & Campion, 
1995). A firm focused on an acquiring strategy may expect experienced employees to 
immediately contribute to the firm with their expertise, and thus a firm may organize them in a 
manner that operates without firm-specificity (Campbell, et al., 2012). While these experienced 
employees may invest in firm-specific HC if it increases their chances for promotion and signals 
8 A third possibility in Makadok (2001) is the complementarities between, in this case, a building and an acquiring 
strategy. However, this chapter considers these two strategies as substitutes at the position-level of analysis. 
9 The development system may be an isolating mechanism (Rumelt, 1984) since it cannot be bought, imitated, or 
transferred because it is difficult to comprehend the causally ambiguous, socially complex, and path dependent 
facets of the system (Coff, 1997; Dierickx & Cool, 1989). In addition, firms can continually learn and improve the 
development program, so it helps retain the developed HC longer and helps the firm sustain economic returns from 
the HC’s future productivity. 
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to other employers that they are model employees (Campbell, et al., 2012), the incentives of 
experienced employees to do so are generally lower than those of novice employees. 
Team complementarities 
To generate team complementarities, firms need to combine the knowledge held by 
individual team members in a cooperative and efficient manner that allows these team members 
to work together interdependently on their tasks (Gardner, Gino, & Staats, 2012; Hackman, 
2002). Due to these intricacies, team complementarities may be more easily created by firms 
building their HC as opposed to firms acquiring their HC.10 Novice employees that are in the 
firm’s development system can learn how to work in their team from the start of their 
employment, and therefore, can understand their task and contribution to the team (Groysberg & 
Lee, 2009). However, experienced employees, who are hired in and have to work in a new team, 
may need to re-develop their social capital inside the firm (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). This task 
may be much more difficult since firms may need to integrate an experienced employee’s skill 
set into an existing functional team (Dokko, Wilk, & Rothbard, 2009). 
Employee motivation 
Motivating novice employees is comparatively more difficult than motivating 
experienced employees, because, novice employees are generally not immediately penalized for 
their poor performance. Firms that pursue a building strategy have more tolerance for the lack of 
employee productivity and expertise since firms are investing in the employees’ development 
(Maister, 1993). Rather, firms commonly incentivize these employees to work harder, such as 
10 This is separate from the team production problem (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972), since in my context, individual 
output may be measured (Kordana, 1995). Firms can evaluate the work of an attorney working with a team of 
lawyers on a case, since deliverables consist of individually written documents (Kordana, 1995: 1914). Further, it is 
customary for partners to read and revise the work of junior attorneys, and the partner’s time for such work is billed 
to the client (Kordana, 1995). 
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with the possibility of advancement and/or annual performance bonuses. For an acquiring 
strategy, firms often select seasoned employees who are financially motivated to work hard 
immediately, in addition to facing the harsh selection environment of being dismissed for failing 
to meet expectations. These firms are likely to operate closer to the labor market, quickly 
replacing those acquired employees discovered to be less productive or experienced.  
Hypotheses 
When firms pursue an HC augmentation strategy, each of these four problems can make 
it challenging for firms to seek economic returns (see Table 2.1 for a summary of the problems). 
If firms can address one or more of these problems, then they can create more economic value 
from augmenting HC. I theorize four firm-level factors—firm reputation, promotion chances, 
external leadership, and augmentation experience—that when combined with each HC 
augmentation strategy may impact a firm’s economic returns. These firm-level capabilities were 
deduced from theory and conform to my conversations over the last few years with several 
managers from law and consulting firms. A firm’s capability may reduce more problems for 
building and/or acquiring. For each factor, I first focus on how it might help address problems 
for a building strategy, and then focus on how it may address problems for an acquiring strategy. 
Firm reputation 
A firm’s reputation represents cumulative judgments formed by stakeholders over time 
based on the firm’s relative success in fulfilling the expectations of these stakeholders (Freeman, 
1984). Potential employees, often junior ones searching for their first employer, incur large 
search costs to acquire accurate information about the wage rates, stability, and working 
conditions of a firm (Stigler, 1962). One way for firms to minimize the information asymmetry 
problem for an employee and maintain themselves as expectation holders is to strengthen their 
18
reputations (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). A stronger reputation acts as a (positive) signal about 
more positive trends and attributes of the firm, which helps reduce a prospective employee’s 
uncertainties (Turban & Greening, 1997). As a result, novice employees of higher quality may be 
more inclined to apply to a reputable firm, which can, in turn, help the firm overcome the 
challenges from pursuing an effective building strategy by being able to select better applicants 
(Greenwood, Li, Prakash, & Deephouse, 2005: 663).  
Firms with stronger reputations can be more effective in recruiting quality HC, 
motivating their HC, and incentivizing their HC to invest in firm-specific HC. First, a stronger 
applicant pool allows for greater utility of an applicant selection system, which increases the 
likelihood of selecting a novice employee that is, on average, a higher quality employee (Lado & 
Wilson, 1994). Since selecting novice employees from a pool of applicants is assumed to be 
random, firms are less likely to make a type 1 error, and thus can gain a competitive advantage 
from reducing the quality uncertainty problem. Second, higher quality applicants are more likely 
to be internally driven to develop their resume as well as their general HC by working at such a 
reputable firm (Bidwell, Won, Barbulescu, & Mollick, 2014), thus reducing the employee 
motivation problem. Third, a stronger reputation may incentivize employees to invest in firm-
specific HC. These employees may have stronger expectations of the firm’s survival and 
therefore may perceive that there is lower risk that their specific investments will decrease in 
value (Wang & Barney, 2006). Therefore, the combination of a firm’s stronger reputation and a 
building strategy can lead to better recruitment and selection of novice HC, and ultimately, 
increases the firm’s economic returns. 
H1(building): Ceteris paribus, the relationship between a firm’s building strategy and a 
firm’s economic returns is positively moderated by a firm’s reputation. 
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Firms that pursue an acquiring strategy derive fewer advantages from having a stronger 
reputation. First, a firm’s better reputation may attract more experienced applicants; however this 
does not reduce the adverse selection problem. Therefore, the quality uncertainty problem 
remains. In addition, a better reputation does not reduce the motivation problem, since there is 
less of a problem to begin with when firms acquire these seasoned employees. Also, usually at 
this stage, experienced employees are motivated less by a firm’s stronger reputation and more 
by, for example, a firm’s monetary benefits. Therefore, I do not hypothesize on the impact of a 
firm’s reputation on improving the effectiveness of an acquiring strategy. 
Promotion chances 
Firms that engage in a building strategy may be able to increase their economic returns 
by pairing this strategy with another firm-level factor: promotion chances. However, scholars 
generally agree that the direct effect of promotion chances on firm performance is negative for 
two reasons. First, firms may need to reduce HC leveraging to increase promotion chances, since 
fewer employees under a single manager reduces the pressure and competition for these 
employees to earn a promotion. Since HC leveraging is directly correlated to firm profits (Hitt, et 
al., 2001; Kor & Leblebici, 2005), decreasing HC leveraging also immediately decreases firm 
profits. Second, according to the Peter Principle, a previously competent employee is usually 
promoted into a higher paid position that often requires the development of new skills and 
abilities (Hitt, et al., 2001; Peter & Hull, 1969). Therefore, promotions are costly to the firm 
because of the increased wage and training costs, but promotions are also necessary to prevent 
the loss of a firm’s HC to the labor market. Despite the costs, increasing promotion chances can 
generate higher economic value for the firm when it is connected with a building strategy. 
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Increasing the likelihood of promotions keeps novice employees satisfied for having 
higher chances of being rewarded, and therefore can reduce the firm-specific HC and motivation 
problems. First, promotions serve to solidify a firm’s commitment to its employees (Milgrom & 
Roberts, 1992), who may reciprocate and lead to higher job commitment from its newer 
employees in hopes that the firm will re-pay them for their loyalty. Second, specifically from a 
reduced leverage ratio perspective, inexperienced employees can seek more guidance and 
mentorship from the more available senior members of the firm (Payne & Huffman, 2005; 
Russell & Adams, 1997). Interactions between these senior members and novice employee 
typically serve as conduits for the transfer of firm-specific HC (Coff, 1997). Therefore, for these 
reasons, increased promotion chances combined with a building strategy can increase a firm’s 
economic returns. 
In the context of law firms, increasing promotion chances when law firms pursue a 
building strategy is even more crucial to generate higher economic returns. First, associates are 
aware that law firms can act opportunistically by not promoting their competent associates 
(Gilson & Mnookin, 1989). Promoting associates to partners is costly for these law firms, who 
now have to share their profits with a new and inexperienced partner, thus reducing overall 
profits per partner (Hitt, et al., 2001). Anticipating this moral hazard problem, novice associates 
will not learn firm-specific elements of the law firm and will shirk in their productivity, which 
then exacerbate the firm-specific HC and motivation problems. Alternatively, increasing 
promotion chances signals to junior associates that the firm may be trustworthy, and that if they 
work diligently and invest in firm-specific HC, they can be rewarded with the prize of 
partnership. 
H2(building): Ceteris paribus, the relationship between a firm’s building strategy and a 
firm’s economic returns is positively moderated by a firm’s promotion chances. 
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Firms that have increased promotion chances for their employees may be more effective 
in their acquiring strategy as well. Similar to novice employees, these experienced employees 
may invest in firm-specific knowledge to show their commitment to the firm, and thus remain in 
the competition for promotion. Further, investment in firm-specific HC may signal to other 
employers that the experienced employee is considered “good” and therefore desirable, which 
increases the employee’s chances for employment outside the firm.11  
H2(acquiring): Ceteris paribus, the relationship between a firm’s acquiring strategy and 
a firm’s economic returns is positively moderated by a firm’s promotion chances. 
 
External leadership 
 Firms often bring in external leaders, defined as managers that the focal firm hired from 
another firm. These external leaders can either build a new team or bring in their own team. 
While bringing in their own team, popularly termed a “lift out,” may be more challenging in 
terms of convincing team members to move, it also has some advantages (Groysberg & 
Abrahams, 2006). First, these external leaders have complementarities with their pre-existing 
team members that can reduce inefficiencies on projects. Second, external leaders have part of 
their firm-specific HC embedded in the collaboration, trust, and relationship with these previous 
team members (Becker, 1976). These circumstances may be difficult to replicate with a new 
group of HC. For these two reasons, it may be more beneficial for external leaders to move with 
their team so as to avoid having “to get acquainted with new colleagues, or to [re-]establish 
shared objectives, mutual accountability, or group norms—needs that can detract from 
performance” (Groysberg, Lee, & Nanda, 2008: 1217). 
11 Unlike the case of novice employees, experienced employees do not necessarily need the attention and assistance 
from managers to the same degree as novice employees do. Therefore, while the effect of promotion chances 
increases the effectiveness of an acquiring strategy, it does so less than that of a building strategy. 
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The effect of external leadership on a building strategy is manifested in the promotion 
chances hypothesis, H2(building). An increase in outside promotions can decrease a novice 
employee’s motivation to work and invest in firm-specific HC. Outside promotions signal to 
novice employees that their firm does not necessarily reward loyalty, and that instead, external 
leaders, who have no previous association with the firm but have potential to earn economic 
returns, can join the firm as a partner immediately. Therefore, I predict no effect of external 
leadership paired with a building strategy on producing economic returns.  
Firms that bring in external leaders and simultaneously acquire external HC can seek 
above-normal economic returns. First, firms can reduce the adverse selection problem by having 
external leaders identify those experienced employees with whom the leader previously worked. 
Second, these seasoned employees can maintain their team complementarities, since they come 
in with the same colleagues with whom they worked at their prior firm. Because these two 
problems are reduced, firms have less post-integration issues with acquiring strategies, and can 
immediately apply their experienced employee’s expertise in the firm. 
H3(acquiring): Ceteris paribus, the relationship between a firm’s acquiring strategy and 
a firm’s economic returns is positively moderated by a firm’s external leadership. 
 
Augmentation experience 
When firms develop more experience with an HC augmentation strategy, they can learn 
how to reduce the particular manifestation of the four fundamental problems associated with that 
HC strategy. In other words, firms can use any knowledge discovered through their past 
experience to improve their current practices, often described as “learning by doing” (Argote, 
1999; Arrow, 1962). For example, with adequate practice and more knowledge of the 
characteristics they are seeking, firms can get better at selecting novice applicants that are better 
matches to the firm (Hatch & Dyer, 2004). In addition, firms acquiring HC may be able to 
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overcome the adverse selection problem by getting better at judging information about HC and 
bidding more optimally. Similar explanations can be provided for how firms can get better at 
inducing employees to invest in firm-specific HC, develop team complementarities, and be more 
motivated.  
Essentially, firms can improve their strategies when they increase their use of a strategy 
as evidenced by previous studies in the literature (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). Makadok (2001) 
posits that capability-building firms can generate a competitive advantage when they continue to 
focus on, not surprisingly, capability building. Also, Maritan and Florence (2008) show that 
firms can develop a resource-picking capability by making more bids in strategic factor markets, 
which eventually leads the firm to become more accurate in bidding. It should be noted that 
firms with, e.g., extensive building experience may sometimes need to acquire HC, but unless 
they have some acquiring experience, they may be less effective with that strategy. Therefore, 
higher order capabilities that result from greater experience can enable firms to augment more 
effectively. 
H4(building): Ceteris paribus, the relationship between a firm’s building strategy and a 
firm’s economic returns is positively moderated by a firm’s building experience. 
 
H4(acquiring): Ceteris paribus, the relationship between a firm’s acquiring strategy and 
a firm’s economic returns is positively moderated by a firm’s acquiring experience. 
 
Data and Variables 
This chapter uses a firm-level panel dataset from the legal industry to assess the impact of 
HC augmentation strategies on a firm’s economic returns. I constructed a large dataset by 
combining a number of different surveys of the largest U. S. law firms (see Appendix B for 
details on the construction of the dataset). For this chapter, the final sample consisted of 148 
firms observed longitudinally from 2004-2009.  
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Return on sales (ROS): Following prior research (Hitt, et al., 2001), ROS is the 
dependent variable of this study and is defined as net income (in thousands) divided by gross 
revenue (in millions) in a law firm. I created a running average of the subsequent two years of 
ROS to create the dependent variable, since an HC strategy may impact the firm in this time 
frame. As a robustness check, I ran the models with a running average of the subsequent three 
years of ROS as the dependent variable, and the results were very similar. The variable has a 
normal distribution in our sample and was deflated (in 2010 dollars) to control for changes due to 
the U.S. gross domestic product.12 For a robustness check, I also used profits per partner (PPP), 
analogous to return on equity, for my regression models, since it has been used in prior work on 
law firms (Chatain, 2011; Kor & Leblebici, 2005). ROS and PPP are correlated at 0.53. I chose 
ROS for the dependent variable instead of PPP for two reasons. First, equity partners are 
shareholders of the firm, but they may not hold an equal share of profits, since it can be based on 
the number of clients a partner brings in, which may vary significantly by partner. Therefore, a 
measure of average profit distribution based on PPP may not accurately reflect the distribution of 
profits among the partners. Second, ROS would indicate how well the firm is generating profits 
per dollar of service provided, which is likely to be impacted by HC strategies. 
HC augmentation strategies: Firms can augment their HC through two different 
strategies: building and acquiring. A firm’s strategy of building entails that a firm develops and 
mentors its employees. The more novice employees a firm brings in through a building strategy, 
the more resources the firm needs to deploy for this strategy, and therefore the more the firm is 
investing in such a strategy. Therefore, I measure the extent a firm pursues a building strategy by 
the number of entry-level associate attorneys, i.e., novice attorneys that a firm hires in a given 
12 Deflating the variable by the 2010 consumer price index yielded similar results. 
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year. Alternatively, the more experienced associate attorneys that a firm brings in, the more a law 
firm is pursuing an acquiring strategy, since these seasoned attorneys will immediately try to use 
their existing skills toward the firm’s projects. An alternative to using associates to measure 
augmentation strategies would be to use partners (Hitt, et al., 2001). However, this creates some 
issues since (1) partners are owners of the firm, introducing agency problems, and (2) 
empirically, profits distributed to these partners is embedded in the dependent variable, which if 
then included creates endogeneity problems.  
Firm reputation: I considered two different measures of a firm’s reputation: workplace 
reputation and client reputation. Workplace reputation is a five-point rating scale measuring the 
satisfaction of mid-level associates employed by firms in the NLJ250 and requires at least five 
responses from each office to be included in the survey. Client reputation is measured as the 
number of America’s largest public and private corporations that a law firm has as their client 
based on the Corporate Representation survey, which includes data from Fortune 500 companies 
as well as from thirty different annual publications. While both measures of firm reputation 
yielded similar results, I chose to use client reputation since it has been used previously as a 
proxy for a firm’s reputation (e.g., Greenwood, et al., 2005). In addition, I created a metric for 
“fair dealing” reputation by averaging the responses to associate-partner relationship, 
management openness, and workplace environment from the mid-level satisfaction survey. This 
can capture the firm’s labor market reputation that may more closely align to my theory. The 
results do not change significantly. 
Promotion chances: Chances for promotion can be measured using either a partnership 
communication variable or constructing a promotion by leverage measure that divides the 
number of promoted partners by the number of associates in the firm. Partnership 
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communication is based on the Mid-level Satisfaction survey which reports on an employee’s 
perception as to whether a firm communicates to the employee regarding partnership in the firm. 
The correlation between the promotion by leverage variable and partnership communication was 
0.05, suggesting these two measures are not related. However, the correlation between the 
promotion leverage variable and building was close to 1. Upon further analysis, the number of 
total associates in the firm was highly correlated with the number of entry-level associates in the 
firm, suggesting possible misspecification of the model by including promotion by leverage. 
Instead, a leverage ratio was included as another control variable and partnership communication 
was used as the variable to measure promotion chances. 
External leadership: External leadership is measured by the number of partners a law 
firm laterally acquires. These partners often have a team of associates that they worked with in 
their prior firm. Since the hiring of an external leader will likely coincide with the hiring of that 
leader’s previous team members (Groysberg & Abrahams, 2006), this construct was measured in 
the same year as the firm’s acquiring strategy. Endogeneity is less of an issue since external 
leaders following their associate attorneys is a less likely scenario. External leadership was also 
used as a control variable in the building models. However, the measurement of external 
leadership in these models was that of the prior year, since an external leader’s decision to build 
would likely occur after arriving at the firm. 
 Augmentation experience: Firms have the capability to develop routines and get better at 
a particular strategy through repetition (Nelson & Winter, 1982). I measure experience by 
calculating the last two years that a law firm uses a particular strategy. Thus, building experience 
is measured as the extent a firm pursued entry-level associates the previous two years for the 
purpose of building, and acquiring experience is measured as the number of lateral associate 
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attorneys acquired in the previous two years. Since experience depreciates, I discounted the last 
year by 20%, which yielded the same results even if 10% and 30% were used. 
 Controls: I use a firm fixed effects model for the longitudinal data that implicitly controls 
for unobserved firm-level variations that do not change over time, such as opening of new 
offices, organizational culture, and practice areas. In addition, I included year dummies that 
control for year-to-year variations. I also controlled for firm size, which is measured by the total 
number of attorneys in a firm per year. This variable is highly correlated with building and 
acquiring strategies since both variables are adding individuals. Replacing total attorneys with 
total partners yielded similar results, possibly because the correlation between these two 
measures of firm size is relatively high at 0.84. As a robustness check, I followed another study 
that used ROS (Hitt, et al., 2001), but did not include firm size as a control variable since the 
denominator of the dependent variable is gross revenue, which captures firm size. In addition, I 
included other control variables, such as the median starting salary of an associate attorney and 
geographic diversification of a firm’s offices. The findings from these models were similar to the 
models with total attorneys as the only control. I also controlled for the two interactions that I did 
not hypothesize for (i.e., external leadership and building strategies, and firm reputation and 
acquiring strategies). Finally, I added a leverage ratio that has been used previously in several 
studies (Hitt, et al., 2001; Kor & Leblebici, 2005) and can have an impact on a firm seeking 
economic returns.  
Model specification: I systematically estimate two fixed effects regression models to test 
my hypotheses. The first model is the impact of a building strategy and firm-level capabilities on 
ROS, and the second model is the impact of an acquiring strategy and firm-level capabilities on 
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ROS. For each model, I reject the null hypothesis (p < 0.01) for the Hausman test, and thus do 
not use random effects. 
ROSi,t+2 = f [β1*Building strategyi,t + β2*Firm reputationi,t-1 + β3*(Buildingi,t X Firm reputationi,t-1) + 
β4*Promotion chancesi,t-1 + β5*(Buildingi,t X Promotion chancesi,t-1) + β6*Building experiencei,t-1 + 
β7*(Buildingi,t X Building experiencei,t-1) + β8*Acquiring strategyi,t + β9*External leadershipi,t-1 +  (1) 
β10*(Buildingi,t X External leadershipi,t) + β11*Leverage ratioi,t + β12*Total attorneysi,t +  
β13*Year fixed effectsi,t + β14*Constanti,t]  
 
 
ROSi,t+1 = f [β1*Acquiring strategyi,t + β2*Promotion chancesi,t-1 + β3*(Acquiringi,t X Promotion chancesi,t-1) +  
β4*External leadershipi,t + β5*(Acquiringi,t X External leadershipi,t) + β6*Acquiring experiencei,t-1 + 
β7*(Acquiringi,t X Acquiring experiencei,t-1) + β8*Building strategyi,t + β9*Firm reputationi,t-1 +  (2)  
β10*(Acquiringi,t X Firm reputationi,t-1) + β11*Leverage ratioi,t + β12*Total attorneysi,t +  
β13*Year fixed effectsi,t + β14*Constanti,t]  
 
where i represents a law firm and t represents time. The full sample runs from 2004-2009. 
However, following from the logic of my theory, the timeline for the impact of these HC 
strategies differ; acquiring strategies can positively impact a firm’s ROS immediately, while 
building strategies can positively impact a firm’s ROS after the HC are trained and developed. 
Therefore, in the building model, the impact on ROS is after two years (see Table 2.4), and in the 
acquiring model, the impact on ROS is after one year (see Table 2.6). 
The moderators may be lagged by one or two years to reduce endogeneity concerns. As a 
robustness check, I added different additional years of data to each table. For building, data were 
available two years prior to that of acquiring. Table 2.5 illustrates the results from these two 
additional years (2002 and 2003). For acquiring, the impact of performance can be tested through 
an additional year (2010) and Table 2.7 illustrates the results from including the additional year. 
The results remain consistent. I added Table 2.8 to determine how building strategies differ 
across a shorter performance timeline. In this table, performance of novice hires is measured 
after one year of development instead of the two or three years under development in the 
previous building tables. 
29
Results 
Table 2.2 shows the descriptive statistics. The average return on sales (ROS) for a law 
firm is about 37 cents per dollar of revenue, which is relatively high compared to other 
industries, but typically characteristic of firms in the service industry (McGahan & Porter, 1997). 
This translates into, on average, $92 million dollars of net income for an average-sized law firm 
with revenues of $250 million. Law firms in my sample augment quite extensively, bringing in 
about 85 new employees per year or about 13% of their firm’s size. Firms build HC 55% of the 
time (or add 47 new novice employees) and acquire 45% of the time (or add 38 new experienced 
employees). In essence, firms build and acquire HC at relatively close proportions in my sample.  
Table 2.3 shows the correlations for all variables in the models. The high correlation of 
0.91 between building experience and building strategies suggests that firms that have built HC 
in the past are likely to continue to build, possibly having learned by doing and are leveraging 
their expertise in these strategies. This correlation also exists between acquiring experience and 
acquiring and is also high at 0.75. If support for Hypothesis 4 is found, then this would suggest 
that firms use their experience as a capability to improve their performance. The high correlation 
of total attorneys with each HC strategy and with each augmentation experience variable is due 
to these variables lying in the same direction and capturing increasing counts of individuals. 
However, the results remain the same when instead of total attorneys other non-correlated 
variables are used to control for firm size (i.e., total partners, American lawyer rankings, and/or 
geographic diversification). 
Table 2.4 shows the results for a building strategy and firm-level capabilities on ROS. 
Most of the control variables are insignificant, except the leverage ratio, which is positive and 
statistically significant in Models 4 and 5. The effect of a building or acquiring strategy on ROS 
30
across all models is either not significant, or negative and significant, which provides support for 
the claim that pursuing an HC augmentation strategy does not simply increase a firm’s economic 
returns. This effect is even more pronounced in Table 2.5. Table 2.5 shows the results of a 
building strategy and firm-level factors on ROS with two additional years of data, and in four of 
the five models, building is negative and statistically significant at the 1% and 5% p-values. 
Therefore, the research question for this chapter is important, as it provides ways for firms to 
generate value from building and acquiring strategies.  
Hypothesis 1 for building posits that firm reputation positively moderates the relationship 
between building and ROS. Results in Model 2 from Table 2.4 indicate that the interaction of 
building and firm reputation on ROS is positive but not statistically significant (β = 0.002; p > 
0.1). Figure 2.1 illustrates this model and shows that firms pursuing a building strategy do not 
increase their ROS with high reputation, but are less likely to decrease their ROS than if they had 
low reputation. Table 2.5 provides statistical support for this finding (β = 0.005; p < 0.01), and 
thus I find some support for Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 for building focuses on the positive 
moderation of promotion chances with building strategies, and I find support for this relationship 
in Models 3 from Table 2.4 (β = 0.186; p < 0.1) and from Table 2.5 (β = 0.269; p < 0.01). As 
shown in Figure 2.2, firms that pursue a building strategy increase their ROS by 3.5 times when 
they increase their chances for promotion. Last,13 Hypothesis 4 for building predicts a positive 
moderation of building experience on the relationship between building strategies and ROS, and 
13 There is no Hypothesis 3 for building, since my theory predicts no logical relationship between building and 
external leadership. The correlation as seen in Table 2.3 between these two variables is low (0.14) and about three 
times lower than that of the correlation between acquiring and external leadership, including both measures of 
external leadership—one year prior and same year. Also, external leadership was insignificant across all models in 
Table 2.4. In addition, this interaction was added as a control variable in a separate model that combines the models 
from Tables 2.4 and 2.6. The interaction term was insignificant, and thus these empirical evidences are consistent 
with my theory. 
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I find statistically significant support for this relationship in Models 4 from Table 2.4 (β = 0.003; 
p < 0.01) and from Table 2.5 (β = 0.004; p < 0.01). Figure 2.3 shows that firms with high 
building experience that also ramp up their HC with novice employees do not necessarily 
increase their ROS. By contrast, firms that had low building experience and chose to ramp up 
with novice employees lost an average of 2% of their ROS or approximately $5 million in net 
income. 
I combine these variables for building in Model 5 from Table 2.4. The highest r2 of 0.190 
and lowest Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) value of 5243 confirms that Model 5 is better 
than the other models from Table 2.4. The interaction term for the promotion chances variable, 
and the interaction term for the building experience variable remain statistically significant, 
which suggests these two are the most important factors for firms to focus on to increase their 
economic returns from a building strategy. The firm reputation interaction term is not statistically 
significant, suggesting that this is a less important factor. When building experience was 
removed from the model in a separate analysis not reported here, the interaction of building and 
firm reputation is statistically significant, along with the interaction of building and promotion 
chances, suggesting firm reputation is a close third factor that impacts a firm’s economic returns, 
after promotion chances and building experience. These results are consistent with the results in 
Table 2.5. Thus, I find support for each of the hypotheses for building on ROS. 
Tables 2.6 and 2.714 show the fixed effects results of an acquiring strategy and its 
moderators on ROS. The effect of an acquiring strategy and/or a building strategy on ROS across 
all models is either not significant, or negative and significant, which suggests that simply 
14 Table 2.7 includes one additional year of data that was not included in Table 2.6 in order to keep the number of 
years from Table 2.6 consistent with the models from Table 2.4. 
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pursuing these augmentation strategies does not automatically increase a firm’s economic 
returns. However, firms can increase their economic returns from an acquiring strategy when 
they pursue certain capabilities that I hypothesize and test. According to Model 2 from Table 2.6, 
the coefficient of the interaction term of acquiring and promotion chances variable is positive but 
not significant (β = 0.079; p > 0.1), which rejects Hypothesis 2 for acquiring. Figure 2.4 shows 
that firms that pursue more of an acquiring strategy, on average, slightly increase their economic 
returns by offering high as opposed to low promotion chances by a net benefit of 0.5% in ROS. 
Hypothesis 3 for acquiring predicts that external leadership positively moderates the relationship 
between acquiring and ROS, and I find a positive and statistically significant relationship (β = 
0.006; p < 0.05) in Models 3 from both tables, thus supporting this hypothesis; Figure 2.5 shows 
indeed a 0.5% increase in ROS when firms bring in external leaders and pursue acquiring 
strategies. Finally, Hypothesis 4 of acquiring predicts a positive moderation of acquiring 
experience on the relationship between acquiring strategies and ROS; this relationship is not 
supported in Models 4 (β = 0.001; p > 0.1), and weakly supported in the full model of Table 6 (β 
= 0.002; p < 0.1). When firms pursue an acquiring strategy as shown in Figure 2.6, acquiring 
experience does not increase a firm’s ROS, but low acquiring experience can reduce a firm’s 
economic returns by as much as 0.5%.  
I combine the moderator variables from the other models into the full model in Model 5 
from Table 2.6. This model has the same AIC value (5339) as Model 3, but also has the highest 
r2 (0.171), which provides support that Model 5 is better than the other models from Table 2.6. 
External leadership and acquiring experience are both positive and statistically significant. Thus, 
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I find strong support for Hypothesis 3 on external leadership, weak support for Hypothesis 4 on 
acquiring experience, and no support for Hypothesis 2 for promotion chances.15   
Table 2.8 analyzes the impact of building strategies on ROS after one year. This 
investigates how the different timelines of building and acquiring strategies matter for 
differential performance. Surprisingly, the results are consistent with previous results in Tables 
2.4 and 2.5. This suggests that the previous discussion on the importance of timelines matters to 
a lesser extent. Firms are able to generate value from their novice HC even under development 
that can indirectly impact the bottom line. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
This chapter is a comparative performance assessment of the strategies of building and 
acquiring. I identify four classic problems that firms may need to address in order to generate 
economic returns from their augmentation strategies. The results suggest that firms can use their 
capabilities to improve the effectiveness of their building strategy and generate economic returns 
for the firm. Specifically, firms that pursue building strategies generate more value by gaining 
building experience, offering their employees opportunities for promotion, and increasing their 
firm’s reputation. Firms that pursue acquiring strategies can generate economic returns if they 
pursue external leadership and possess prior acquiring experience, but not through offering their 
experienced employees increased promotion chances. 
There are some limitations of this chapter. First, I consider two augmentation strategies—
building and acquiring—as substitutes, but it is also possible to view them as complements or 
interconnected (Makadok, 2001; Ployhart, et al., 2011), especially because of the high 
15 In a separate analysis (not shown) that combines the regression models of building in Table 2.4 and acquiring in 
Table 2.6 in a single table, the results remain consistent. 
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correlation between acquiring experience and a building strategy (0.59) as well as building 
experience and an acquiring strategy (0.47). This is an area of potential future research to 
investigate how firms can manage the different performance timelines in a manner that optimizes 
their augmentation strategies. Another limitation is that my current research question is studied 
in the context of law firms. In order to generalize the results to other contexts, this research 
question needs to be explored in different industries, which could also be an area of future 
research. Finally, the finding that building strategies may not matter across different timelines 
suggests a possible endogeneity problem. Firms that pursue building strategies may be utilizing 
them distinctly than from acquiring strategies so much so that they are able to generate increased 
performance immediately after they have been working in the firm for a year in development. 
The main contribution of this chapter is in the identification and discussion of the classic 
four problems—quality uncertainty, firm-specific HC, team complementarities, and employee 
motivation—that can collectively distinguish between building and acquiring. In this chapter, I 
explore how addressing each problem can help firms generate higher economic returns from 
their HC augmentation strategy. Future research can focus on identifying additional firm-level 
capabilities that can address one or more of the classic problems, and also identifying particular 
contexts or conditions under which the manifestation of these problems may be either diminished 
or enhanced. Additionally, I found that HC building strategies begin to generate value for the 
firm immediately or soon after novice employees are acquired, rather than starting to generate 
value only after the two-year-mark. An extension of this research would study the value created 
by these novice employees in subsequent years and when and if they reach a value-generating 
plateau. Chapter 4 extends this chapter by introducing a context condition, the impact of the 
business cycle, on how firms generate value from the building and acquiring strategies.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 2.1: Manifestation of 4 classic problems in each HC augmentation strategy 
Four classic 
problems 
Literature and research 
studies associated with 
problems 
Building strategy Acquiring strategy 
Quality 
uncertainty 
Roots in labor economics 
and executive recruitment: 
Acemoglu and Pischke 
(1998), Akerlof (1970), and 
Zajac (1990). 
 
The firm initially has 
poor information 
about its novice HC, 
but this problem 
reduces over time as 
the firm learns about 
their employee’s 
skills and abilities. 
 
Firms have more 
information about 
these experienced 
employees, but the 
adverse selection 
problem applies. 
Firm-specific  
HC 
Roots in human resources, 
labor economics, and 
strategy: Becker (1964), 
Barney and Wright (1998), 
Campbell, Coff, and 
Kryscynski (2012), Lepak & 
Snell (1999), and Mahoney 
and Pandian (1992).  
Firm-specific HC is 
often built in the 
firm’s development 
programs, along with 
general HC. 
 
Experienced 
employees have less 
well developed firm-
specific HC, and will 
often rely on their 
existing (general) 
HC. 
Team 
complementarities 
Roots in organizational 
theory and strategy: Alchian 
and Demsetz (1972), 
Gardner, Gino, and Staats 
(2012), Groysberg and Lee 
(2009), and Hackman 
(2002). 
 
Complementarities 
within teams are 
more easily formed 
in conjunction with 
the firm’s 
development system 
and through work 
experience. 
Experienced 
employee may have 
to re-develop 
complementarities 
with a new team in 
their new firm. 
Employee 
motivation 
Roots in law, professional 
service firms, and strategy: 
Eisenhardt (1985), Galanter 
and Palay (1991), Maister 
(1993), Malos and Campion 
(1995) 
 
Employees are 
motivated for the 
opportunity to 
develop their general 
HC development and 
chances for 
promotion. 
Firms operate closer 
to the labor market 
with these experience 
employees, ensuring 
strict dismissal 
policies for failing to 
meet expectations. 
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics  
  Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      overall between within     
(1) Building strategy 47.16 38.69 36.18 12.24 3 250 
(2) Acquiring strategy 38.70 39.03 35.77 18.61 0 276 
(3) Firm reputation 22.09 28.41 21.07 19.04 1 265 
(4) Promotion chances 3.03 0.55 0.48 0.31 1 5 
(5) External leadership (1 year prior) 11.52 13.46 10.90 7.56 0 122 
(6) External leadership (same year) 11.71 12.94 10.34 7.32 0 95 
(7) Building experience 89.20 70.81 66.09 18.74 7 443 
(8) Acquiring experience 76.41 70.74 63.35 27.30 1 461 
(9) Leverage ratio 1.56 0.90 0.86 0.12 0 5 
(10) Total attorneys 636.37 404.64 389.63 58.13 169 2524 
(11) Return on sales (2 years later) 370.46 87.50 90.85 26.50 95 676 
(12) Return on sales (1 year later) 370.39 84.55 84.91 26.34 123 676 
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Table 2.4: Fixed effects model of a building strategy on ROS (2004-2009) 
  (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) 
  Controls H1 building H2 building H4 building Full model 
Building strategy 0.153 0.069 -0.387 -0.404* -0.931** 
  (0.120) (0.144) (0.335) (0.216) (0.376) 
Building X Firm reputation   0.002 
  
-0.001 
    (0.002) 
  
(0.002) 
Building X Promotion chances   
 
0.186* 
 
0.180* 
    
 
(0.108) 
 
(0.107) 
Building X Building experience   
  
0.003*** 0.003*** 
    
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Firm reputation 0.076 -0.098 0.056 0.073 0.163 
  (0.074) (0.181) (0.074) (0.073) (0.205) 
Promotion chances -4.676 -4.676 -12.38** -3.887 -11.23* 
  (3.947) (3.947) (5.951) (3.915) (5.912) 
External leadership 0.053 0.057 0.063 0.039 0.045 
  (0.165) (0.165) (0.164) (0.163) (0.163) 
Building experience 0.016 0.008 0.007 -0.304** -0.341** 
  (0.076) (0.077) (0.076) (0.128) (0.139) 
Building X External leadership -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Acquiring strategy 0.066 0.075 0.074 0.061 0.062 
  (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.079) (0.080) 
Leverage ratio 18.17 18.53 17.78 25.12** 25.26** 
  (11.28) (11.28) (11.25) (11.38) (11.41) 
Total attorneys 0.012 0.008 0.008 -0.005 -0.008 
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Constant 341.4*** 349.1*** 368.3*** 374.3*** 398.8*** 
  (27.56) (28.51) (31.60) (29.27) (33.09) 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies (2004-2009) YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 568 568 568 568 568 
Firms 148 148 148 148 148 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.140 0.141 0.144 0.159 0.162 
Akaike Information Criterion 5255 5255 5253 5244 5243 
F-test 6.159 5.800 5.960 6.523 5.927 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01 
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Table 2.5: Fixed effects model of a building strategy on ROS (2002-2009) 
  (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) 
  Controls H1 building H2 building H4 building Full model 
Building strategy -0.092 -0.232** -0.831*** -0.773*** -1.487*** 
  (0.097) (0.108) (0.284) (0.196) (0.333) 
Building X Firm reputation   0.005*** 
  
0.002 
    (0.002) 
  
(0.002) 
Building X Promotion chances   
 
0.269*** 
 
0.269*** 
    
 
(0.097) 
 
(0.096) 
Building X Building experience   
  
0.004*** 0.003*** 
    
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Firm reputation 0.122* -0.332* 0.088 0.119* -0.082 
  (0.073) (0.178) (0.073) (0.072) (0.194) 
Promotion chances -4.693 -4.699 -15.07*** -3.79 -14.27*** 
  (3.524) (3.502) (5.134) (3.484) (5.068) 
External leadership -0.127 -0.094 -0.112 -0.117 -0.091 
  (0.158) (0.157) (0.157) (0.155) (0.155) 
Building experience -0.038 -0.060 -0.056 -0.416*** -0.400*** 
  (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.119) (0.125) 
Building X External leadership 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Acquiring strategy 0.027 0.040 0.034 0.022 0.034 
  (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.074) (0.074) 
Leverage ratio 0.95 0.90 0.93 10.550 9.438 
  (9.60) (9.55) (9.55) (9.78) (9.80) 
Total attorneys 0.045* 0.031 0.038 0.033 0.022 
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Constant 372.5*** 389.0*** 408.3*** 400.3*** 439.1*** 
  (23.20) (23.80) (26.45) (23.94) (27.13) 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects (2002-2009) YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 704 704 704 704 704 
Firms 148 148 148 148 148 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.106 0.118 0.117 0.131 0.143 
Akaike Information Criterion 6681 6673 6673 6663 6655 
F-test 5.298 5.518 5.506 6.091 5.986 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01 
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Table 2.6: Fixed effects model of an acquiring strategy on ROS (2004-2009) 
  (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) 
  Controls H2 acquiring H3 acquiring H4 acquiring Full model 
Acquiring strategy -0.022 -0.244 -0.148 -0.213 -0.558 
  (0.082) (0.292) (0.100) (0.145) (0.341) 
Acquiring X Promotion chances 
  
  0.079 
  
0.074 
  (0.100) 
  
(0.104) 
Acquiring X External leadership   
 
0.006** 
 
0.006** 
    
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
Acquiring X Acquiring    
     experience  
  
  
0.001 0.002* 
  
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Firm reputation 0.059 0.058 0.052 0.082 0.077 
  (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074) (0.074) 
Promotion chances -3.751 -6.466 -4.299 -3.517 -6.550 
  (3.973) (5.250) (3.964) (3.968) (5.268) 
External leadership 0.147 0.121 -0.316 0.218 -0.229 
  (0.175) (0.178) (0.276) (0.180) (0.280) 
Acquiring experience -0.039 -0.043 -0.037 -0.090 -0.098 
  (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.082) (0.082) 
Acquiring X Firm reputation 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Building strategy 0.029 0.031 0.027 0.016 0.015 
  (0.117) (0.117) (0.116) (0.117) (0.117) 
Leverage ratio 1.36 1.05 -0.34 1.450 -0.405 
  (11.32) (11.33) (11.29) (11.30) (11.28) 
Total attorneys 0.019 0.019 0.024 0.014 0.018 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Constant 377.0*** 386.1*** 384.2*** 383.8*** 399.7*** 
 
(26.91) (29.27) (27.00) (27.19) (29.86) 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects (2004-2009) YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 578 578 578 578 578 
Firms 148 148 148 148 148 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.132 0.131 0.140 0.136 0.143 
Akaike Information Criterion 5343 5345 5339 5342 5339 
F-test 5.919 5.536 5.879 5.7 5.352 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01 
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Table 2.7: Fixed effects model of an acquiring strategy on ROS (2004-2010) 
  (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) 
  Controls H2 acquiring H3 acquiring H4 acquiring Full model 
Acquiring strategy -0.101 -0.227 -0.224** -0.210* -0.256 
  (0.077) (0.282) (0.095) (0.123) (0.301) 
Acquiring X Promotion chances 
  
  0.045 
  
0.006 
  (0.097) 
  
(0.100) 
Acquiring X External leadership 
  
  
 
0.006** 
 
0.006* 
  
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
Acquiring X Acquiring  
     experience 
  
  
0.001 0.000 
  
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Firm reputation -0.024 -0.025 -0.026 -0.024 -0.026 
  (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Promotion chances -2.705 -4.125 -3.225 -2.662 -3.394 
  (3.709) (4.817) (3.703) (3.708) (4.821) 
External leadership 0.187 0.173 -0.260 0.213 -0.236 
  (0.173) (0.175) (0.267) (0.174) (0.298) 
Acquiring experience -0.001 -0.001 -0.008 -0.044 -0.016 
  (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.066) (0.068) 
Acquiring X Firm reputation 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Building strategy -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.014 -0.002 
  (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.110) (0.110) 
Leverage ratio -1.78 -1.64 -2.77 -1.504 -2.653 
  (10.00) (10.01) (9.97) (10.00) (10.01) 
Total attorneys 0.023 0.023 0.029 0.021 0.028 
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Constant 379.4*** 383.4*** 384.8*** 384.3*** 386.0*** 
  (23.58) (25.08) (23.62) (23.95) (25.41) 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects (2004-2010) YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 655 655 655 655 655 
Firms 148 148 148 148 148 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.115 0.114 0.122 0.116 0.119 
Akaike Information Criterion 6130 6131 6125 6130 6129 
F-test 5.572 5.206 5.559 5.289 4.887 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01 
    
42
Table 2.8: Fixed effects model of a building strategy on ROS (2002-2009) after one year 
 
  (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) 
  Controls H1 building H2 building H4 building Full model 
HC building 0.036 -0.057 -0.710** -0.589** -1.314*** 
  (0.140) (0.161) (0.340) (0.233) (0.382) 
HC building X Firm reputation   0.002 
  
-0.001 
    (0.002) 
  
(0.002) 
HC building X Promotion chances   
 
0.260** 
 
0.250** 
    
 
(0.108) 
 
(0.107) 
HC building X Building 
     experience  
  
  
0.003*** 0.004*** 
  
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Firm reputation 0.051 -0.143 0.023 0.046 0.133 
  (0.074) (0.181) (0.075) (0.073) (0.206) 
Promotion chances -2.134 -2.122 -12.81** -1.195 -11.40* 
  (3.945) (3.943) (5.923) (3.908) (5.879) 
External leadership 0.088 0.084 0.125 -0.052 -0.027 
  (0.308) (0.308) (0.306) (0.307) (0.307) 
Building experience -0.009 -0.019 -0.021 -0.355*** -0.395*** 
  (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.128) (0.139) 
HC building X External leadership 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.005 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
HC acquiring  -0.004 0.005 0.007 -0.010 -0.005 
  (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.078) (0.078) 
Leverage ratio -6.099 -5.730 -6.588 1.303 1.338 
  (11.27) (11.27) (11.21) (11.35) (11.35) 
Total attorneys 0.007 0.004 0.003 -0.011 -0.015 
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Constant 386.9*** 395.3*** 423.4*** 423.9*** 457.7*** 
  (27.78) (28.70) (31.52) (29.60) (33.04) 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects (2002-2009) YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 575 575 575 575 575 
Firms 148 148 148 148 148 
Adjusted R-Squared .124 .126 0.135 0.145 0.155 
Akaike Information Criterion 5330 5330 5324 5316 5312 
Bayesian Information Criterion 5395 5399 5393 5386 5390 
F-test 5.196 4.946 5.292 5.711 5.439 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01 
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Figure 2.1: Firm reputation as a moderator for a building strategy on ROS 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Promotion chances as a moderator for a building strategy on ROS 
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Figure 2.3: Building experience as a moderator for a building strategy on ROS 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Promotion chances as a moderator for an acquiring strategy on ROS 
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Figure 2.5: External leadership as a moderator for an acquiring strategy on ROS 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Acquiring experience as a moderator for an acquiring strategy on ROS 
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Chapter 3: When Do Firms Invest in Developing Rookies? 
A Firm-level Analysis of the Decision to Build versus Acquire Human Capital 
Introduction 
At the 2013 annual conference of the Association for Legal Career Professionals, hiring 
partners from a few large law firms were part of a panel discussion on associate-level 
augmentation strategies entitled, “Homegrown or not: Law student recruiting versus lateral 
[associate] hiring” (Lat, 2013). Essentially, the panel discussion focused on how firms decide 
whether to build or acquire HC. Law student recruiting is an initial step in a firm-level strategy 
of building. Building means that firms hire, train, and develop novice employees so that they can 
become productive in the firm over time. The primary alternative to a building strategy is an 
acquiring strategy. Lateral hiring, mentioned as the alternative in the panel’s title, is an example 
of an acquiring strategy, in which firms hire previously trained, developed, and productive 
employees from other firms.  
Historically, many firms chose to exclusively pursue one HC augmentation strategy16 or 
the other; however, this is no longer the case (e.g., see Appendix A for an overview of hiring 
practices in law firms over the last fifty years). According to Figure A.1, from 1999 to 2008, on 
average, law firms used each augmentation strategy in roughly equal proportions, bringing in a 
total of about fourteen associates into their firm each year.17 In addition, Figure B.3 plots each 
law firm’s mix of strategies in a given year on log axes, showing that almost all firms pursue 
both strategies, though in varying proportions, across all years. Even Cravath, Swaine, & Moore, 
16 Building and acquiring are generally substitutes for each other concerning individual augmentation decisions, 
however, this chapter’s focus is to aggregate each individual hiring decision to form the firm’s overall augmentation 
strategy. 
17 Data are not available since 2008 from this source since overall hiring counts dropped significantly during this 
recessionary period, however, based on additional analysis, the trends of the “equal mix” remain relatively the same. 
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a large law firm that prides itself on being a building firm, broke with this philosophy in 2011 
when it hired 20% of its associates laterally (2013). The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: first, 
I seek to understand the nuances of the building and acquiring phenomenon, in which firms 
pursue them at relatively equal levels; second, I determine what drives when these firms are 
more likely to rely on their building strategies rather than acquiring strategies. 
The members of the panel attempted to explain the core advantages of each HC 
augmentation strategy, however, the advantages they mentioned do not clearly distinguish 
building from acquiring. For example, the panel mentioned that building strategies help firms 
“build a strong culture” (Lat, 2013:1). Culture is embraced by novice employees when they are 
in the firm’s development system. However, culture can also be embraced by experienced 
employees when they are in the firm’s integration program (Savarino, 2013), and firms can build 
a strong culture around an acquiring strategy. For example, Cognition, LLP18 has done this and 
created a core competency by drawing upon the unique perspectives of their laterally hired 
employees (Savarino, 2013). Firm culture plays an undeniable role for both augmentation 
strategies, however, it does not seem to account for the differences between building and 
acquiring strategies. 
The panel also concluded that acquiring strategies can help firms to “fill gaps in their 
talent pipelines” (Lat, 2013). While this may be the case some times, there are other times when 
it clearly is not. For example, if this talent gap is at the entry level, firms may pursue a building 
strategy to replace the same level of talent that they are missing. Also, if the firm cannot find the 
necessary talent in the lateral labor markets, then it may need to develop this talent in-house. 
18 Though Cognition, L.L.P. is an outlier that relies exclusively on an acquiring strategy, it nicely illustrates how the 
panel’s conclusions are too simplistic and do not clearly match actual practice. 
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Since the panel’s discussion of the HC strategies do not offer unique explanations for law firms 
or for other services firms’ choice between the two, this chapter seeks to address this debate by 
explicating two underlying drivers influencing the firm’s choices between these two strategies. 
The two main drivers that help explain when firms rely more on building than acquiring 
strategies are the degrees to which firms can engage in (1) mentorship and (2) long-horizon 
investments. Mentorship is defined as firms’ capabilities to provide their HC with knowledge, 
guidance, feedback, and support so that these HC can develop and become productive in the firm 
(Coff, 1997; Payne & Huffman, 2005; Russell & Adams, 1997). Professional and graduate 
schools typically do not provide the practical training that novice employees need to be effective 
in a firm, and such practical training is often provided by the firm’s practicing employees and 
managers in the form of feedback (Chen, 2010; Segal, 2011). Long-horizon investments are 
firms’ capabilities to pursue HC investments that take a “long” period of time to pay off and, by 
definition, are initially less productive HC for a long period of time as well (Souder & Bromiley, 
2012; Souder & Shaver, 2010). Based on these two drivers, I generate hypotheses that can 
provide insight into when building seems more appropriate than acquiring. In addition, I generate 
hypotheses for situations in which firms may not be able to pursue mentorship or long-horizon 
investments, and thus are more likely to rely on acquiring strategies. I test these hypotheses in 
the context of the legal industry since it clearly illustrates the phenomenon (see Appendix A for a 
historical analysis of building and acquiring strategies in the legal industry), and also to provide 
law firms an analysis that can inform decisions they may be facing in this new environment in 
which acquiring strategies are now at parity with building strategies. 
I make three contributions in this chapter. First, I theorize two attributes—mentorship and 
long-horizon investments—in order to explore the question of why firms differentially rely on 
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building vis-à-vis acquiring, a choice that is of interest to HC management scholars, as well as in 
order to provide the mechanisms for firms to seek competitive advantages from their HC 
augmentation strategies (Cappelli, 2008; Coff & Kryscynski, 2011). Alternatively, I hypothesize 
firm-level factors that provide less mentorship or focus on short-horizon investments and thus 
may lead managers to rely differentially on acquiring vis-à-vis building strategies (Menon & 
Pfeffer, 2003). Finally, the unique nature of my data allows me to measure both building and 
acquiring strategies, which has been an empirical challenge. In the next sections, I review the 
literature that can provide more insight into the nuances of this phenomenon and then identify 
theoretical mechanisms and firm-level factors that help clearly distinguish building from 
acquiring strategies. 
Literature Review 
The strategic HC literature has independently investigated the advantages of both 
building (Barney & Wright, 1998; Becker, 1964; Hatch & Dyer, 2004; Hitt, et al., 2001) and 
acquiring (Campbell, et al., 2012; Gardner, Stansbury, & Hart, 2010; Somaya, Williamson, & 
Lorinkova, 2008), but has less thoroughly examined these two HC strategies as two different 
endpoints of a band on the spectrum of firms’ augmentation options (Cappelli, 2008; Rynes, et 
al., 1997). These research articles suggest that firms pursue acquiring strategies that include 
individuals acquired from the unemployed labor market.19 Also, these articles suggest that firms 
should pursue acquiring primarily to fill unexpected shortfalls in the existing talent pipeline, 
however, it is not clear why a firm cannot promote from within to fill these gaps, and then 
19 This is an important point since in my current empirical context acquiring is strictly bringing in experienced 
employees from other firms, not hiring from the unemployment market. While these ex-employees may have some 
skills in which they would be part of an acquiring strategy, they may also need to be re-trained and thus can be 
incorporated as part of a building strategy. 
50
subsequently bring in a novice employee to fill the entry-level position (Doeringer & Piore, 
1971). In this chapter, I consider these two HC strategies as co-equal in that both can be 
effective, and I identify the unique drivers of when firms differentially focus on each. 
While I adopt a more firm-level perspective that looks at HC augmentation choices, the 
literature has taken a somewhat atomistic approach that looks at individual-level hiring decisions 
in isolation from a firm’s overall strategy (Bidwell, 2011). Firms can fill a given vacancy either 
through an internal hire, defined as an existing employee inside the firm, or through an external 
hire.20 The literature suggests that firms favor internal hires because doing so motivates existing 
workers (Chan, 1996) and because internal hires have relatively better performance than external 
hires for a given position (Bidwell, 2011). However, this finding is inconsistent with trends in 
actual practice. In December 2004, Taleo, a supplier of talent management solutions, created a 
talent index that shows major talent trends within Fortune 500 firms (Taleo, 2005). That month, 
two-thirds of the 275,126 vacancies in these Fortune 500 firms were filled by outside hires rather 
than internal hires (Taleo, 2005). Peter Cappelli acknowledged the changes in the practices and 
commented on this trend (Taleo, 2005). 
The data shows that large corporations still offer lots of opportunities for entry 
and advancement. The fact that such a high percentage of openings are filled from 
the outside now represents a sharp contrast with earlier periods, when most 
vacancies would have been filled from within, and it suggests that these 
corporations are much more open to outside talent than they have been in the past. 
20 There is literature investigating internal versus external hiring of CEOs (Datta & Guthrie, 1994; Harris & Helfat, 
1997; Lauterbach, Vu, & Weisberg, 1999; Zajac, 1990) but this literature is less connected with my analysis of 
associate-level HC strategies. A CEO’s salary is substantially higher than that of an associate’s salary (Liberto, 
2013). Also, a CEO can singlehandedly change the culture of the firm, whereas a single associate is less likely able 
to do so. 
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This might also suggest that something important has changed about careers that 
movement across companies has now become a more important path to the top. 
Assuming firms make positive net present value (NPV) choices, since either building or 
acquiring might have an equal likelihood of being deemed effective, this chapter suggests that 
certain factors can influence decisions about which HC strategy is more preferable.  
Building and acquiring strategies have also been examined in labor economics 
(Althauser, 1989; Lazear & Oyer, 2004; Osterman, 1984; Pfeffer & Cohen, 1984). In this 
literature, building is characterized by lifetime employment structures in which employees enter 
at the outset of their careers, and move up along a career system implemented by the firm 
(Althauser, 1989). Acquiring is characterized by outside hiring of personnel for positions (Lazear 
& Oyer, 2004). Both strategies are costly, and differ in the allocation of these costs. In some 
cases, acquiring strategies are cheaper than building strategies because of reduced training costs, 
but in other cases, acquiring strategies can be more expensive than building because of increased 
recruiting costs and monetary incentives to entice experienced employees to join the firm (Stroh 
& Reilly, 1994).  
The core theoretical driver of building strategies is the need for highly skilled workers 
(Althauser, 1989), but this has narrow applications. First, small firms that need highly skilled 
workers are at a disadvantage since they cannot afford to implement a resource-intensive training 
and development system (Stroh & Reilly, 1994). Second, firms that need skills in a new line of 
business can rely more on an acquiring strategy to find experienced employees who may have 
worked in that line of business (Kor & Leblebici, 2005). Finally, firms that need highly skilled 
workers may need to use either building or acquiring strategies to find instructors to train these 
new workers, which is another important factor, but is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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Another stream of literature focuses on the benefits of human resource (HR) practices for 
employment systems (Becker & Gerhart, 1996; Delery & Doty, 1996; Huselid, 1995; Lepak, 
Liao, Chung, & Harden, 2006; Lepak & Snell, 1999), e.g., internal-based employment systems, 
analogous to building strategies, and market-based employment systems, analogous to acquiring 
strategies. Lepak and Snell (2002) categorize talent-driven firms under a market-based 
employment system, and recommend HR practices that focus on retention. However, not only is 
there variability within talent-driven industries, there is much variability in typical HR practices 
within a firm. A firm often implements different augmentation strategies—building and 
acquiring—at varying levels at different times. For example, law firms pursue both internal-
based and market-based employment systems in tandem, respectively. This chapter adopts this 
dual-option notion that both strategies can be successful depending on a firm’s circumstances, 
rather than focusing on bundles of exclusive HR practices for a particular employment system 
(Datta, Guthrie, & Wright, 2005). In the next section, I focus on the theoretical drivers of 
building and acquiring, and generate hypotheses to test this theory. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Mentorship 
The two factors that can help distinguish between building and acquiring strategies are 
firms’ capabilities to provide mentorship and to pursue long(er)-horizon investments. Mentorship 
broadly focuses on the collaboration and exchange of knowledge among experienced and 
inexperienced colleagues, and is becoming increasingly an important aspect of training and 
development. IBM requires colleagues of different ages and skill-levels to interact and thus 
mentor each other to bridge gaps in leadership, experience, diversity, and generations for their 
talent development (Murrell, Forte-Trammell, & Bing, 2008). The largest knowledge gaps exist 
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in junior-level colleagues; such gaps are often closed by senior-level colleagues who have the 
expertise to provide coaching, guidance, and advice (Coff, 1997; Emelo, 2012; Payne & 
Huffman, 2005; Russell & Adams, 1997). 
Building strategies require more mentorship than acquiring strategies. First, novice 
employees are developing their HC, and need to learn the ways to execute various work-related 
tasks within the firm more so than experienced employees. Second, novice employees need more 
critical feedback on their work, which is a powerful mechanism for organizational learning and 
reducing errors (Argote, 1999; Greve, 2003; Maister, 1993). For example, in law firms, partners 
monitor a novice associate’s work, helping them fix and learn from their mistakes (Kordana, 
1995). Third, novice employees need mentors to help them discover their strengths and 
weaknesses, and also assist them in making career-related decisions. 
Managerial slack in talent-driven industries can play a crucial role in providing 
mentorship to developing junior employees’ HC. Talent-driven firms often structure their HC, 
such as managers and employees, in the form of a pyramid, known as knowledge hierarchies 
(Garicano, 2000). Managers are typically located higher on the knowledge hierarchy than 
employees, since they handle more difficult and often only tacitly-described problems. 
Employees can move up the knowledge hierarchy as they learn to solve these more challenging 
problems. However, if too many employees move up and become managers, then firms need to 
bring in more employees to maintain the pyramid structure of the knowledge hierarchy. 
When firms bring in HC to maintain the pyramid structure, they are more likely to pursue 
building than acquiring strategies. The excess supply of managers gives these managers less 
work overall, and thus they are more available to support mentorship of novice HC. One of the 
primary costs of mentorship is the time and attention that these senior colleagues would 
54
otherwise devote to their work with clients. Talent-driven firms can utilize this excess expertise 
towards the development of novice talent to potentially improve their firms’ future performance. 
These firms would be less likely to pursue acquiring, since these experienced HC need less 
mentoring, and thus the firm would not be able to take full advantage of its excess and available 
expert talent. 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, the greater the managerial slack, the more likely firms 
will rely on building than acquiring strategies. 
 
Long-horizon investments 
Long-horizon investments are a firm’s investments in HC that take significant time to 
pay-off (Souder & Bromiley, 2012; Souder & Shaver, 2010). Building strategies are more of a 
long-horizon investment compared to acquiring strategies because (1) it often takes 3-5 years 
before firms recover their investments from their building strategies and because (2) firms spend 
time developing their novice HC in order for them to be productive later (Benson, Finegold, & 
Mohrman, 2004; Cappelli, 2008: 116; Loewenstein & Spletzer, 1997). Attempting to speed up 
the process internally through increased spending or allocation of additional resources can lead 
to time compression diseconomies and the ineffective development of these HC (Dierickx & 
Cool, 1989; Pacheco de Almeida, Henderson, & Cool, 2008). Firms that pursue acquiring 
strategies typically have a shorter payoff period. Experienced HC are likely to possess more 
readily deployable skills and make fewer mistakes after they are integrated into the firm 
(Campbell, et al., 2012; Mayer, et al., 2012), thus making them almost immediately productive 
(Chadwick & Dabu, 2009). 
One consideration when studying horizon length is the amount of a firm’s financial slack, 
defined as the cushion afforded by firms having a supply of uncommitted or excess resources, 
such as excess cash (Bourgeois, 1981; Cyert & March, 1963; Mahoney, 2005; Penrose, 1959). 
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Financial slack can be used to fund unexploited opportunities or reserved inside the firm as a 
financial buffer against bad times. This allows the firm the flexibility to learn, adapt, or initiate 
changes, if necessary (Audia & Greve, 2006; Bourgeois, 1981).  
Firms with financial slack are more likely to pursue building strategies.21 Financial slack 
enables these firms to pursue long-horizon investments because the firm has a financial buffer in 
case the investment does not deliver acceptable economic returns. By contrast, firms with low 
levels of financial slack will generally favor acquiring strategies, because these strategies are 
much less of a long-horizon investment. In such cases, firms are not in position to wait for the 
deferred payoffs and would rather possibly upgrade their competitive position by immediately 
acquiring experienced employees (Souder & Shaver, 2010). 
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, the greater their financial slack, the more likely firms will 
rely on building than acquiring strategies. 
 
External leadership 
The capability to provide mentorship and to pursue long-horizon investments drives a 
firm’s investment in building rather than acquiring strategies. However, it should also hold true 
that firms unable to provide substantial mentorship or that choose to forgo long-horizon 
investments in favor of immediate benefits are more likely to pursue acquiring strategies. These 
next sections investigate these alternative capabilities, e.g., external leadership, and alternative 
contexts, e.g., turnover shocks, that encourage firms to pursue acquiring rather than building 
strategies. 
21 The opposite would be the case in industries such as academia or professional sports where the performance of 
HC is readily apparent (Lewis, 2004). In such “visible” industries, firms with financial slack would more likely to 
“buy talent” by pursue acquiring strategies to hire identifiable stars from other firms (Groysberg, 2010; Hess & 
Rothaermel, 2011). However, in the context of law firms and other industries where individual performance is not 
readily visible, the quality uncertainty problem exists (see Chapter 2), and firms would not take the risk of buying 
potentially adverse talent (Akerlof, 1970; Makadok, 2001). 
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Firms that have alternative capabilities, e.g., they pursue external leaders to lead a new 
area of business or to manage the opening of a new office, are likely to pursue acquiring 
strategies. First, these firms that pursue both external leaders and acquiring strategies can address 
the quality uncertainty and team complementarities problems associated with generating 
economic returns (see Chapter 2). Second, these lift outs or team acquisitions (Groysberg & 
Abrahams, 2006; also see external leadership hypothesis in Chapter 2) are quite common. In 
2001, the CEO of Optimus Solutions that services computer systems acquired an outside 
manager and also acquired the thirty-person team that the manager worked with (McGregor, 
2006). 
Firms are more likely to pursue acquiring strategies when bringing in external leaders 
because less mentorship is needed and less of long-horizon investments are involved. First, firms 
do not need to provide additional mentorship since the relationship between the managers and 
employees remains intact, thus allowing for the continued sharing of team-specific mentorship 
that originally led these managers and their teams to be productive at their prior firm (Groysberg, 
2010). Second, these firms can take advantage of immediate economic returns with this strategy, 
a process that otherwise takes substantial time and resources generate team complementarities 
(Groysberg, et al., 2008; see Chapter 2). 
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, the greater their acquiring of external leaders, the more 
likely firms will rely on acquiring than building strategies. 
 
Turnover shocks 
Particular contexts, e.g., experiencing turnover shocks, may also lead firms to pursue 
acquiring strategies. Turnover shocks are negative disruptions to firms’ current activities that 
stem from the excessive loss of HC (Dess & Shaw, 2001; Glebbeek & Bax, 2004; Shaw, Park, & 
Kim, 2013). These turnover shocks result in wasted time and resources, as well as delays in 
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providing client services. While firms may be able to absorb small disruptions to their HC, 
turnover shocks may need to be handled more carefully in order to offset any departure-related 
interruptions, restore current operations, and prevent poor productivity.  
Firms that face increasingly severe turnover shocks will more likely respond by pursuing 
acquiring strategies. These firms need to immediately backfill the vacancies caused by the 
turnover shock to maintain continuity in client services by rapidly acclimating to this disruption. 
Unlike in normal cases of individual openings (i.e., talent filling), in which firms can choose to 
either build or acquire at the position-level of analysis, the massive gaps caused by turnover that 
rise to the level of a turnover shock, by definition are large enough that the options are 
constrained and the only real choice is acquiring strategies.  
Firms that face turnover shocks are less likely to pursue long-horizon investments 
because they cannot wait for a large cohort of inexperienced employees to develop their HC 
while turnover shocks may be threatening the firm's survival. Also, senior-level colleagues may 
not be able to spend time mentoring because they will be preoccupied with dealing with the 
repercussions of the turnover shocks, such as understanding and working on any of the former 
departed employees’ unfinished projects. If the turnover shocks result in the loss of at least 10% 
of the firms’ employees, the impact would be tremendous in terms of expended resources, 
employee time, and discontinuity in services or production, thus increasing the appeal of 
pursuing acquiring strategies to quickly recover from this shock (Kimball, 2006). 
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, when firms experience turnover shocks, they are more 
likely to pursue acquiring rather than building strategies. 
 
Data and Variables 
This chapter uses a firm-level panel dataset from the legal industry to assess the impact of 
HC augmentation strategies on a firm’s economic returns. I constructed a large dataset by 
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combining a number of different surveys of the largest U.S. law firms. See Appendix B for 
details on construction of the dataset. For this chapter, the final sample consisted of 126 firms22 
observed longitudinally from 2003-2009.  
Building ratio: The dependent variable is the ratio of building strategies to total hiring 
strategies. Total hiring strategies is the sum of building and acquiring strategies. This variable 
captures the extent that firms are investing in building strategies. Following prior research (see 
Chapter 2), building strategies are measured by the number of entry-level associates that a firm 
hires, and acquiring strategies are measured by the number of lateral mid-level associates that a 
firms hires in a given year. Compared to novice associates, mid-level associates have adequate 
training and experience to hit the ground running at their new firm. I created a two-year and 
three-year average of this variable, and the results were the same. I stayed with the two-year 
average in order to maintain a larger sample size.  
Managerial slack: Managerial slack is measured by the inverse of the average leverage 
ratio for the last three years. This measure captures the extent to which firms have managers 
available to provide mentorship to their employees. Leverage ratio is often used in the literature 
to measure how hard associates are working in the firm (Hitt, et al., 2001; Kor & Leblebici, 
2005; Sherer, 1995). The inverse indicates the ratio of managers per employee, which captures 
the extent to which the firm can provide mentorship and guidance to employees. Firms may have 
different mentorship models and different conceptualizations of what mentoring entails (Ghosh, 
2013:152). For example, firms that are pressured to focus on short-term financial metrics have 
little room for mentoring (Harper, 2010). In other cases, where firms are not constrained by such 
22 There are 22 fewer firms in the construction of this dataset than that in Chapter 2, since for these firms, the 
associate turnover ratio was missing. 
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metrics, they may mentor every employee or focus on the top notch employees. My fixed effects 
model captures instances in which firms maintain their mentoring philosophy. However, to 
examine cases in which firms select a different mentoring model, I test my regression model in 
sub-samples of firms that have high versus low leverage ratios on average across all years and 
discuss my findings in the results section. 
Financial slack: Previous studies have measured financial slack by the firm’s return on 
equity (ROE) (Bourgeois, 1981). In law firms, the equivalent to ROE is profits per partner or 
PPP (Chatain, 2011; Kor & Leblebici, 2005; Maister, 1993). Therefore, financial slack is 
measured by the firm’s average net income over the previous three years divided by the average 
number of partners over the previous three years. The variable has a normal distribution and was 
deflated (expressed in 2010 dollars) to control for changes due to change in the U.S. GDP. An 
alternative approach not used in this study is to measure financial slack by creating a composite 
index of several financial measures (Barreto, 2012). Since many of the financial measures are 
strongly correlated to one another, this approach could lead to misspecification of the models and 
therefore was not adopted. 
External leadership ratio: External leadership ratio is measured by the number of 
partners a law firm laterally acquires divided by the total number of partners inside the firm. If 
these partners want to bring their team of associates who worked with them at their prior firm, it 
will likely occur soon after the external leader joins their new firm (Groysberg & Abrahams, 
2006). Therefore, this construct is lagged by one year and does not have a running average. 
 Turnover shock: Turnover shocks differ from regular turnover of employees since a 
shock suggests a significantly larger magnitude and impact to the firm. Firms that have lost a 
significant portion of their HC are facing turnover shocks. Therefore, I developed this as a 
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dummy variable with values of 20%, 25%, and 30% of HC losses compared to the total number 
of attorneys inside the firm. The largest number generated the existing results even though at 
either value the results were the same. To avoid the turnover shock variable to be confounded 
with the control variable of associate turnover ratio, associate turnover ratio was set to zero for 
positive turnover shock observations. 
 Controls: I use a firm fixed effects model for the longitudinal data that implicitly controls 
for unobserved firm-level variations that do not change over time. In addition, I included year 
dummies that control for year-to-year variations. I also controlled for firm size, measured by the 
total number of attorneys, since larger firms are likely to pursue more building since they have 
more potential resources to do so. Promoted partner ratio was controlled for since depending on 
the culture of the firm, more promoted partners can lead firms to pursue either more building or 
more acquiring strategies. I also controlled for turnover at the associate-level and partner-level, 
since these can drive augmentation. If a firm pursued a layoff in a particular year, this was 
captured separately by a dummy variable. Finally, geographic diversification, calculated using 
the measures in previous studies (Hitt, et al., 2001; Kor & Leblebici, 2005), controls the extent to 
which a firm’s offices are concentrated, controlling for the number of attorneys in those offices. 
Model specification: I estimate a fixed effects regression model with an AR(1) 
disturbance to test my hypotheses. I reject the null hypothesis (p < 0.01) for the Hausman test, 
which suggests fixed effects is more appropriate to use than random effects. The model below 
shows the dependent, independent, and control variables.  
Building ratioi,t+1 = f [β1*Managerial slacki,t + β2*Financial slacki,t + β3*External leadership ratioi,t + 
β4*Turnover shocki,t + β5*Total attorneysi,t + β6*Promoted partner ratioi,t + β7*Associate turnover ratioi,t + 
β8*Partner turnover ratioi,t + β9*Layoffi,t + β10*Geographic diversificationi,t + β11*Year fixed effectsi,t + 
β12*Constanti,t]    
 
where i represents a law firm and t represents time. The full sample runs from 2003-2009.  
61
Results 
Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics and Table 3.2 shows the correlations for all 
variables in the models. The building ratio for a law firm is about 57 percent, in that on average, 
firms invest in building at slightly higher percentages than acquiring. The takeaway from this 
percentage is that firms pursue both building and acquiring strategies at relatively close 
proportions, which is an important assumption for this analysis and therefore studying law firms 
is a suitable context for my analysis. Another important relationship to note is the -0.57 
correlation between financial slack and managerial slack. Firms that cannot provide much access 
to its managers have, by definition, a higher leverage ratio; the positive relationship between 
leverage ratio and profits per partner is well established (Hitt, et al., 2001; Kor & Leblebici, 
2005), and our sample is in accordance with these established findings.  
Table 3.3 shows the results from analyzing when firms are more likely to invest in 
building strategies. The first model shows only the control variables. The second model shows 
the results from Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 posits that managerial slack is an indication of a 
firm’s capability to provide mentorship, and therefore a firm is more likely to invest in building 
strategies. The coefficient for managerial slack in Model 2 is statistically significant (β = 0.164; 
p < 0.01), and thus I find strong support for Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 posits that financial 
slack indicates a firm’s capability to pursue long horizon investments, and thus be able to invest 
more in building than acquiring strategies. From Model 3, I find strong statistical support for 
Hypothesis 2 as well (β = 0.105; p < 0.01). In the full model, both of these results remain 
statistically significant (p < 0.01), which provides strong support that a firm is more likely to 
invest in building strategies when it has the capability to provide mentorship and pursue long-
horizon investments.  
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The next two hypotheses focus on when firms are less likely to pursue building strategies 
and more likely to pursue acquiring strategies. Hypothesis 3 suggests that when firms have less 
of a capability to provide mentorship (i.e., they bring in external leaders who are expected to 
provide economic returns to the firm immediately), a firm is more likely to pursue acquiring 
strategies. The coefficient of external leadership in Model 4 is negative, but statistically 
insignificant (β = -0.144; p > 0.1), and therefore I find no support for Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 4 
suggests that when firms are facing turnover shocks, they are more likely to pursue acquiring 
strategies since they do not have time to pursue long-horizon investments. I find statistical 
significance at the 10% level (β = -0.068; p < 0.1), this effect disappears in the full model (β = -
0.062; p > 0.1), and therefore I find no strong support for Hypothesis 4. These last two results 
suggest that while a firm may be more inclined to pursue acquiring strategies in these alternative 
cases (since the sign of the coefficient is in the theorized direction), there is no strong statistical 
support. In conclusion, I find strong statistical support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, but no strong 
statistical support for Hypotheses 3 and 4. 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 explore subsamples of firms with different leverage ratios. In Table 
3.4, firms that have high leverage ratio are likely to pursue building based on their available 
financial slack, but not managerial slack. In Table 3.5, I find the opposite result, in that firms that 
have low leverage ratios are likely to pursue building based on their available managerial slack, 
but not financial slack. This may be theoretically sound. Firms that have high leverage ratios are 
more constrained to find available managers to invest in mentorship, however, these firms may 
possess the finances to invest in resources that substitute for the lack of mentorship. In low 
leveraged firms, they utilize their managerial expertise to mentor novice employees and therefore 
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do not need to invest in financial resources. This seems to be an important underlying boundary 
condition that needs to be explored in future research. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
This chapter investigates when a firm will invest in building strategies. Compared to 
acquiring strategies, building strategies entail a firm having capabilities to provide mentorship 
and pursue long-horizon investments. The results for when a firm is more likely to pursue 
building strategies are strongly supported. When a firm can provide novice employees access to 
its managers who can then provide mentorship, and when a firm has financial resources to pursue 
long-horizon investments, the firm is more likely to pursue building strategies. I do not find 
statistical support for when a firm is more likely to pursue acquiring strategies. A firm that has 
more external leaders and therefore cannot provide much mentorship, or that is facing turnover 
shocks that limit its capabilities to pursue long-horizon investments are likely to pursue acquiring 
or building strategies. One explanation for this unexpected finding in that novice employees 
brought in by an external leader or in response to a turnover shock could be of higher caliber 
than the average novice employee, and therefore need overall less mentorship and less time for 
development.  
One limitation of this study is that I do not distinguish between different calibers of 
novice employees. This would be the next path to take in order to provide additional support for 
the results, such as identifying the prestige of the university from which novice employees 
graduated from (Hitt, et al., 2001). Another limitation is that I do not measure mentorship or 
long-horizon investments, but rather theorize that these mechanisms drive the results. One way 
to address the concern about my assumptions would be to conduct interviews with partners at 
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large law firms, and ask them about these mechanisms. In the next sections, I provide this 
information. 
To corroborate my findings, I include relevant information from interviews with partners 
at large law firms. Indeed, available partners “carefully watch over [their] associates, amending 
and supplementing their work as needed” to assist in their development (Galanter & Palay, 1991: 
99). According to a partner at a large law firm, associates “get[ting] regular feedback from the 
partners who [they] work directly for” is critical to the mentorship process. Building strategies 
are also more of a long-horizon investment since, novice associates’ billable time often needs to 
be written off while they are in training (Hillman, 1997). However, after some time when these 
associates are mentored, they are “less likely to make substantive errors or incorrect choices of 
procedure” especially “when the benefit of someone with more experience is available” in case 
these associates need assistance (Lawpro, 2002: 22). Therefore, managerial slack and the ability 
to pursue long-horizon investments are important factors in a firm’s decision to build.  
Firms pursuing acquiring strategies also may need to assign mentors to these newly 
acquired experienced employees, “taking the lateral to lunch or dinner, explaining available 
committee and training meetings of interest, and checking in within sixty days or so to ‘see how 
things are going’” (Savarino, 2013:2). For example, Mayer Brown, a large law firm, has a formal 
pipeline that includes the assignment of laterals to either an office head, practice area leader, or 
another senior lawyer to ensure the lateral’s initial integration needs are met (Karabin, 2012; 
Savarino, 2013). However, these integration needs are initial and temporary compared to the case 
of building. 
There are two main contributions in this chapter to the decision of whether to invest in 
building rather than acquiring strategies. First, the strategic HC literature notes the importance of 
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distinguishing between different types of HC (Coff & Kryscynski, 2011; Lepak & Snell, 1999). 
This chapter takes this research a step further by theorizing and testing the decision to invest in 
one strategy, namely building, relative to another strategy, acquiring. Second, I identified and 
tested two key mechanisms—mentorship and long-horizon investment—that drive the decision 
to invest in building relative to acquiring strategies. 
In conclusion, by looking at the antecedents to when firms pursue augmentation 
strategies, this chapter complements Chapter 2, which looks at how firms generate value after 
pursuing augmentation strategies. This chapter is focused on understanding phenomena in large 
law firms, which can be generalized to other talent-driven businesses since they mostly also 
deploy, in relatively equal proportions, both building and acquiring strategies (Jones & 
Rothschild, 2011; Wholey, 1985). However, an extension of this stream of research would focus 
on actually studying these research questions in the different industries where HC is critical for 
firms, e.g., accounting, architecture, engineering, medicine, and other professional services 
firms. It would be useful to investigate whether the mechanisms of mentorship and long-horizon 
investments are as critical in these industries and if there are other mechanisms that are valuable 
in these contexts. 
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Tables 
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics  
  Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      overall between within     
(1) Building ratio 0.57 0.18 0.16 0.10 0.10 0.97 
(2) Managerial slack (H1) 0.91 0.44 0.42 0.10 0.24 2.88 
(3) Financial slack (H2) 0.73 0.47 0.43 0.19 0.22 2.80 
(4) External leadership ratio (H3) 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0 0.47 
(5) Turnover shock (H4) 0.08 0.28 0.28 0.20 0 1 
(6) Total attorneys 504.11 301.95 300.82 62.40 146 1994 
(7) Promoted partner ratio 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0 0.15 
(8) Associate turnover ratio 0.18 0.07 0.05 0.05 0 0.46 
(9) Partner turnover ratio 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0 0.004 
(10) Layoff 0.08 0.28 0.18 0.25 0 1 
(11) Geographic diversification 0.38 0.24 0.23 0.04 0.04 1.00 
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Table 3.2: Correlation table 
                        
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) Building ratio                     
(2) Managerial slack (H1) -0.22           (3) Financial slack (H2) 0.46 -0.57          
(4) External leadership 
ratio (H3) -0.37 0.13 -0.16         
(5) Turnover shock (H4) -0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.06        
(6) Total attorneys 0.10 -0.29 0.33 0.04 -0.01       
(7) Promoted partner ratio -0.06 -0.04 -0.07 0.07 0.05 0.02      
(8) Associate turnover ratio -0.04 -0.14 0.14 0.05 -0.01 0.05 -0.08     (9) Partner turnover ratio 0.04 -0.27 0.21 -0.09 0.07 -0.46 -0.10 0.57    
(10) Layoff 0.21 0.00 0.27 0.04 0.02 0.15 -0.15 0.26 0.03   
(11) Geographic 
diversification 0.28 -0.23 0.23 -0.23 -0.01 -0.47 -0.11 -0.04 0.56 -0.08 
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Table 3.3: Fixed effects model of firm-level variables on investments in building (2003-2009) 
  (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) (Model 6) 
DV: Building ratio Controls H1  H2 H3 H4 Full Model 
Managerial slack (H1)   0.164***       0.169*** 
    (0.051) 
   
(0.051) 
Financial slack (H2)   
 
0.105** 
  
0.117*** 
    
 
(0.044) 
  
(0.044) 
External leadership ratio (H3)   
  
-0.144 
 
-0.032 
    
  
(0.187) 
 
(0.185) 
Turnover shock (H4)   
   
-0.068* -0.062 
    
   
(0.040) (0.039) 
Total attorneys (in 100s) 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.011 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Promoted partner ratio -0.015 0.023 0.000 -0.005 0.005 0.060 
  (0.180) (0.177) (0.179) (0.180) (0.180) (0.176) 
Associate turnover ratio -0.032 0.024 -0.041 -0.031 -0.062 -0.011 
  (0.062) (0.064) (0.062) (0.062) (0.064) (0.066) 
Partner turnover ratio 0.120 0.072 0.134 0.116 0.148 0.111 
  -0.129 -0.127 -0.128 -0.129 -0.129 -0.128 
Layoff 0.007 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.010 0.000 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Geographic diversification -0.144 -0.160 -0.168 -0.147 -0.139 -0.184 
  (0.130) (0.128) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.128) 
Constant 0.023 -0.001 0.042 0.017 -0.022 -0.023 
  (0.056) (0.055) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects (2003-2009) YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 480 480 480 480 480 480 
Firms 126 126 126 126 126 126 
Akaike Information Criterion -1298 -1311 -1304 -1297 -1300 -1318 
F-test 21.32 20.77 20.53 19.70 20.01 17.93 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01 
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Table 3.4: Fixed effects model of firm-level variables on investments in building (2003-2009) 
with a subsample of firms that have high leverage  
 
  (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) (Model 6) 
DV: Building ratio Controls H1  H2 H3 H4 Full Model 
Managerial slack (H1)   -0.110       0.141 
    (0.214) 
   
(0.226) 
Financial slack (H2)   
 
0.214*** 
  
0.238*** 
    
 
(0.064) 
  
(0.070) 
External leadership ratio (H3)   
  
0.054 
 
0.206 
    
  
(0.322) 
 
(0.318) 
Turnover shock (H4)   
   
-0.030 -0.037 
    
   
(0.057) (0.057) 
Total attorneys (in 100s) 0.018* 0.018* 0.020** 0.018* 0.018* 0.020** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Promoted partner ratio -0.086 -0.098 -0.047 -0.093 -0.082 -0.050 
  (0.212) (0.214) (0.207) (0.217) (0.213) (0.214) 
Associate turnover ratio -0.008 -0.017 -0.006 -0.008 -0.019 -0.008 
  (0.087) (0.090) (0.085) (0.088) (0.090) (0.092) 
Partner turnover ratio 0.181 0.193 0.220 0.184 0.185 0.224 
  -0.164 -0.166 -0.160 -0.165 -0.164 -0.163 
Layoff 0.010 0.009 0.000 0.010 0.011 0.001 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Geographic diversification -0.111 -0.115 -0.251 -0.107 -0.099 -0.233 
  (0.216) (0.217) (0.214) (0.218) (0.218) (0.217) 
Constant 0.108* 0.106* 0.148** 0.111* 0.101* 0.159*** 
  (0.060) (0.061) (0.059) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects (2003-2009) YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 249 249 249 249 249 249 
Firms 65 65 65 65 65 65 
Akaike Information Criterion -703.1 -701.4 -716.7 -701.1 -701.5 -712.7 
F-test 12.85 11.86 13.49 11.79 11.82 10.98 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01 
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Table 3.5: Fixed effects model of firm-level variables on investments in building (2003-2009) 
with a subsample of firms that have low leverage 
 
  (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) (Model 6) 
DV: Building ratio Controls H1  H2 H3 H4 Full Model 
Managerial slack (H1)   0.195***       0.185*** 
    (0.056) 
   
(0.057) 
Financial slack (H2)   
 
-0.00721 
  
-0.023 
    
 
(0.071) 
  
(0.069) 
External leadership ratio (H3)   
  
-0.195 
 
-0.094 
    
  
(0.242) 
 
(0.235) 
Turnover shock (H4)   
   
-0.099* -0.081 
    
   
(0.058) (0.057) 
Total attorneys (in 100s) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
Promoted partner ratio 0.075 0.157 0.077 0.068 0.131 0.198 
  (0.312) (0.299) (0.313) (0.312) (0.312) (0.302) 
Associate turnover ratio -0.020 0.080 -0.019 -0.017 -0.069 0.039 
  (0.091) (0.092) (0.091) (0.091) (0.095) (0.097) 
Partner turnover ratio 0.006 -0.056 0.006 0.006 0.068 -0.004 
  (0.208) (0.200) (0.208) (0.208) (0.210) (0.204) 
Layoff 0.012 0.000 0.012 0.010 0.017 0.004 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Geographic diversification -0.116 -0.166 -0.115 -0.119 -0.113 -0.161 
  (0.173) (0.167) (0.173) (0.173) (0.172) (0.167) 
Constant -0.117 -0.136 -0.118 -0.115 -0.289** -0.277** 
  (0.120) (0.111) (0.120) (0.120) (0.130) (0.121) 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects (2003-2009) YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 231 231 231 231 231 231 
Firms 61 61 61 61 61 61 
Akaike Information Criterion -595.7 -610.7 -593.8 -594.7 -598.1 -608.1 
F-test 10.00 10.66 9.181 9.261 9.594 8.780 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01 
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Chapter 4: How Business Cycle-Driven Changes in Employee Search Frictions 
Impact the Generation of Value from Building and Acquiring Strategies 
Introduction 
Business cycles are defined as cyclical fluctuations characterized by alternating stages of 
upturns and downturns (Bromiley, Navarro, & Sottile, 2008; Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989; 
Navarro, 2006). Figure B.1 shows fluctuations in the performance of firms in the legal industry 
from the last three decades. These changes in performance are often associated with changes in a 
firm’s HC strategies (Andors, 2012; Knoop, 2010), since the number of attorneys in the legal 
industry closely parallels performance (see Figure B.1), except in the case of the most recent 
cycle. Zooming into the recent cycle, Figure B.2 shows that law firms increased their HC 
augmentation strategies during the upturn years of 2004-2007 in the business cycle, and 
decreased these strategies, especially acquiring, during the downturn years of 2008-2011 in the 
business cycle. Despite such changes in their HC strategies, law firms’ performance was 
consistently high (see revenue per lawyer in Figure B.2 from 2004-2011), and was even insulated 
from significant decreases that typically manifest during the downturn years. The focus of this 
chapter is in understanding this phenomenon, building on the findings from Chapter 2, on how a 
firm adjusts its capabilities to generate economic returns when pursuing augmentation 
throughout a business cycle. 
A major way that business cycles can impact firms’ HC augmentation strategies is 
through employee search frictions (ESFs) (Andolfatto, 1996; Shimer, 2010). ESFs can be 
thought of as the balance between employee confidence about, and barriers to, searching for and 
securing another job. ESFs have been used to model the business cycle (Mortensen, 1970; 
Mortensen & Pissarides, 1994). These models assume that on average, employees seek to 
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maximize their utility and will not knowingly forgo an opportunity for improvement (Devine & 
Kiefer, 1993; Lippman & McCall, 1976). Therefore, assuming rational expectations, employees 
will continually evaluate employment opportunities both at their current firm and at a potential 
new firm (Devine & Kiefer, 1993; Meisenheimer & Ilg, 2000).23 ESFs reflect employee 
perceptions of potential and real employment opportunities and typically fluctuate in a cyclical 
manner that is influenced by the business cycle. The business cycle influences firms’ behavior, 
which influences employees’ behavior through ESFs, which in turn influences back on firms’ 
behavior in a temporary feedback loop that lasts only until the next transition between expansion 
and contraction.  
Including ESFs in the analysis relaxes the assumptions of inelasticity on the supply of 
labor (Barney, 2001),24 which are typically controlled for because of the potential significant 
impact on firms’ economic returns (Makadok, 2001). Firms may anticipate, endure, and react to 
ESFs differently during the business cycle25 (Acemoglu, 1996; Andolfatto, 1996; Hansen, 1985; 
Merz, 1995; Picchio & van Ours, 2011). This chapter relaxes the inelastic supply of firm-specific 
HC assumption by studying the impact of business cycle-driven ESFs on a firm’s capabilities to 
generate economic returns from the firm’s building and acquiring strategies. In addition, similar 
to previous studies (Carrington, McCue, & Pierce, 1996; Mackey, Molloy, & Morris, 2014; 
23 While there are more assumptions of the ESF model, the previous listed items in this paragraph are the basic 
assumptions that are needed for this chapter to continue. 
24 The resource-based view would assume that the supply of firm-specific labor is perfectly inelastic in the short-run 
(Barney, 2001). However, relaxing this inelasticity assumption would more closely align with my phenomena. “For 
example, if there is a shortage of engineering talent in a particular market, the price of this talent in this labor market 
will increase, and the number of people who make their engineering talent available in this market—either by 
training to become engineers or by moving from another market to this market—will increase.” (Barney, 2001: 645). 
Including the business cycle in my analysis would mimic this example and relax the inelasticity assumption. 
25 This chapter focuses on how firms generate value in the presence of changes levels of ESFs. Most of the firms’ 
search frictions have been accounted for in the quality uncertainty problem. 
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Rogerson, Shimer, & Wright, 2005), this chapter applies a macroeconomic theory to a micro 
context—firms in the legal industry. 
To continue my analysis, it is essential to understand the impact of ESFs on the four 
classic problems—quality uncertainty, firm-specific HC, team complementarities, and employee 
motivation—associated with building and acquiring strategies. For example, when ESFs are 
lower, quality uncertainty may be more problematic in acquiring; a firm is likely to get a larger 
pool of experienced applicants about whom the value is lesser known, because of the lack of 
reluctance to enter the labor market. However, in the case of building, when ESFs are lower, 
quality uncertainty may be less problematic because a firm is likely to have an easier time 
finding novice employees (Acemoglu, 1996). When ESFs are higher, the fewer firms that are 
hiring may be able to find more qualified candidates, since the lesser qualified candidates tend 
not to search during these difficult times (Meisenheimer & Ilg, 2000). Changing ESFs can affect 
the relative importance of quality uncertainty and the other three classic problems. 
Additionally, the conventional division of the business cycle into simple upturns and 
downturns (Dobbs, Karakolev, & Malige, 2002; Navarro, 2006; Rigby, 2001) may obscure the 
effects of ESFs. I draw on Mascarenhas and Aaker (1989) who distinguish four stages in the 
business cycle—early expansion, continuing expansion, early contraction, and continuing 
contraction—to gain a more complete understanding of the impact of a business cycle. For 
example, novice employees benefit more from searching in the early expansion stage than any 
other stage because of the additional mobility options they can potentially gain from being 
trained in the continuing expansion stage. However, experienced employees benefit more from 
searching in the late expansion stage because of the perception that they can deliver value to the 
firm immediately and before early contraction. Focusing on undifferentiated upturns and 
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downturns may encourage neglect of significant changes in ESFs that often linger across stages. 
Thus, I adopt the four-stage cycle of expansions and contractions that may capture the changes in 
ESFs more accurately. 
In pursuing this approach, this chapter makes three contributions. First, this chapter 
focuses on a surprisingly understudied phenomena—the business cycle—to highlight employee’s 
perspectives in reference to addressing the supply and demand of HC (Bromiley, et al., 2008; 
Makadok, 2001) and to complement Chapter 2’s focus on firms’ perspectives. Second, this 
chapter extends the micro-foundations approach towards the strategic HC literature (Coff & 
Kryscynski, 2011) by identifying ESFs as a mechanism by which the business cycle can impact 
the four classic problems, firm’s capabilities, and how firms generate value from their building 
and acquiring strategies. Third, this chapter helps to refine the analysis of the business cycle by 
following Mascarenhas and Aaker’s (1989) approach of breaking the cycle into four, instead of 
the conventional two, stages and so giving more resolution to our understanding of the effects 
that ESFs can have on HC augmentation strategies. The rest of this chapter is as follows: I first 
provide a brief literature review of the business cycle and associated HC strategies; then I outline 
the effects of ESFs on the theory and hypotheses described in Chapter 2; and finally I present the 
results and discussion from my empirical analysis of these phenomena.  
Literature Review 
While the focus of this chapter is on employee-side search frictions, it is important to first 
consider the firm’s pursuit of HC strategies at various stages during the business cycle because 
firm’s HC strategies may shape employees’ search decisions. During expansion stages of the 
business cycle, consumers demand more goods and services, and firms demand more skills to 
meet this increase in consumer demand (Eckstein & Sinai, 1990). By contrast, during contraction 
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stages of the business cycle, there is a decline in consumer demand for goods and services and 
consequently, a decline in the demand for skills in the labor market (Eckstein & Sinai, 1990). 
Thus, conventional wisdom suggests that firms typically pursue augmentation strategies during 
economic expansions and move away from these strategies during economic contractions (Greer, 
1984; Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989; Pearce & Michael, 2006).26 Therefore, HC augmentation 
strategies closely follow and parallel the business cycle (Galanter & Henderson, 2008), however 
this is not necessary and may not be profitable as examined in later sections. 
However, firms may choose to defy conventional wisdom because they choose to 
anticipate possible upcoming stages in the business cycle (Dobbs, et al., 2002; Pearce & 
Michael, 2006). For example, firms that supply services to Fortune 500 firms generally lag the 
general economic cycle, which provides these suppliers some foresight regarding the economic 
cycle. Knowing that the average recession is temporary, lasting on average only eleven months27 
(Rigby, 2001: 102), firms may hoard labor to avoid transaction costs from severing contractual 
commitments only to reform them shortly thereafter when economic times improve (Fay & 
Medoff, 1985). Also, hoarding helps maintain employee morale and loyalty, and the potential 
value from holding such skills can be quickly realized when deployed in an early economic 
expansion stage (Fay & Medoff, 1985). Therefore, in defiance of conventional wisdom, firms 
may choose not to exclusively pursue cost-cutting strategies during economic contractions and 
instead pursue augmentation strategies. 
26 During economic contractions, firms not only bring in less HC, they may also sever relationships with existing 
HC to reduce their costs (Foster, Haltiwanger, & Syverson, 2008). 
27 While this is typically the case, in my empirical context, the recession lasted much longer, enabling a clear 
distinction between early and late contraction stages. 
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Firms may pursue countercyclical augmentation strategies as an opportunity to augment 
talent that is available at a bargain price and that has the potential to bolster their core business or 
to re-structure their existing HC (Rigby, 2001). During contraction stages, firms can often gain 
higher quality HC at a significant discount because of scarce opportunities for these employees 
who are likely facing high ESFs (Greer & Ireland, 1992). Such countercyclical strategies pursued 
in the contraction stages have shown to increase firm performance, especially in the following 
expansion stages (Greer & Ireland, 1992; Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989; Navarro, Bromiley, & 
Sottile, 2010). This chapter acknowledges that firms can pursue augmentation throughout the 
business cycle stages, however, the competitive advantage may not necessarily stem from 
mindlessly pursuing such cyclical or countercyclical strategies.28 Instead, it often involves 
addressing the four classic problems that manifest themselves in various ways and degrees 
depending on a firm’s particular circumstance in the particular business cycle stage. 
In addition, firms can also deviate from the conventional strategies of augmenting HC by 
employing alternative arrangements, e.g., hiring from the unemployment market and external 
churning (Andors, 2012; Cappelli & Neumark, 2004). Firms may consider hiring from the 
unemployment market, as a substitute for acquiring strategies, because of the potential to bring in 
HC at a bargain (Andors, 2012). However, hiring quality talent from the unemployment market 
is very challenging. The adverse selection issue is very true, since if the ex-employee were of 
higher quality compared to their other employees at its prior firm, he or she would typically still 
be employed. 
28 For example, while firms may acquire employees at a bargain during the economic contraction, such discounts 
may not last during the economic expansion, when these employees are likely to demand higher wages reflecting 
their market value in the improved labor market with its decreased ESFs. 
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Another employment arrangement is external churning, in which firms use contingent 
workers to gain some flexibility, i.e., reducing total labor needed during a recession in order to 
shield their permanent employees from instability and insecurity (Cappelli & Neumark, 2004). 
Firms can use these alternative, often shorter-term, arrangements to respond to changes during 
the business cycle, however, the focus of this chapter is on the longer-term building and 
acquiring strategies. In some cases, shorter-term arrangements can translate into longer-term 
augmentation strategies (Cappelli & Neumark, 2004), and these would be captured in my 
empirical approach. 
 This chapter uses the theory of employee search frictions to explain the differences in 
augmentation strategies across the business cycle. An alternative theory to ESFs is the theory of 
matching models (Mackey, Molloy, & Morris, 2014; Shimer, 2010), which has been used to 
provide a theory of unemployment across the business cycle. When firms expend resources to 
find suitable workers, a matching function determines the number of workers and firms that meet 
as a function of the unemployment rate and firms’ recruiting efforts (Shimer, 2010). Fluctuations 
in the profitability of a work, possibly due to fluctuations in aggregate productivity, induce 
fluctuations in recruiting (Shimer, 2010). 
 In equilibrium, firms will hire employees at certain wages based on demand and supply. 
When a contraction in the economy occurs, the firms demand curve for labor shifts to the left in 
that firms demand fewer workers and at lower wages. As the contraction stage continues on, 
many workers will choose to leave the industry to find employment elsewhere, thus shifting the 
supply curve to the left and returning to the economy to the steady-state. When a expansion in 
the economy happens, the firms demand curve shifts to the right, in which firms are willing to 
pay higher wages and invest in more workers. As the expansion stage continues, more workers 
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will enter the labor force, shifting the supply curve to the right as well. This dynamic equilibrium 
is useful for analyzing the impact of the business cycle, however, it falls short from explaining 
the phenomena in industries.  
Wages are typically rigid and do not adjust downward in the recessions (Carrington, et 
al., 1996). Since recessions are often temporary, firms do want to expend resources to restructure 
an employee’s contract to reflect market wages in the expansion stage. Instead, firms smooth 
wages over the business cycle (Carrington, et al., 1996). Since wages do not fall, and then firms 
also reluctant to create new jobs, thus increasing the unemployment rate and duration. Firms may 
also choose to employ fewer workers in the expansion phase because hiring is costly (Shimer, 
2010). Typically there are more employment opportunities in periods of expansion than in 
periods of contraction, suggesting that firms do increase spending in response to their 
productivity increases. Firms may be able to take advantage of the early expansion phase since 
wages move less than one-for-one with the shock (Shimer, 2010). Firms can respond in this time 
frame to the relatively lower wages during an early expansion to pursue augmentation strategies. 
This chapter takes these assumptions as a starting point and elaborates on it in the next section. 
In sum, this chapter analyzes the fluctuations of ESFs across the stages of the business cycle, and 
subsequently the impact of these fluctuations on firm’s augmentation strategies and the four 
classic problems. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Each of the two augmentation strategies—building and acquiring—and four problems—
quality uncertainty, firm-specific HC, team complementarities, and employee motivation—
matter differently across the four stages of early expansion, continuing expansion, late 
contraction, and continuing contraction. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 compile this level of analysis for 
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building and acquiring strategies, respectively. The relative intensity level of each problem is 
ranked in terms of relevance, i.e., very low, low, medium, high, and very high. One of the 
driving factors of the noted differences in the problems between building and acquiring is the 
different time horizons for impacting performance (Chadwick & Dabu, 2009; Dierickx & Cool, 
1989; Pacheco de Almeida, Henderson, & Cool, 2008).  
While building and acquiring are both investments in HC, acquiring reflects short-term 
fluctuations in client demand. As a result, acquiring varies more to the extremes across the 
business cycle than does building. Focusing on each cell in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 would be of 
limited or questionable value as well as tedious to read through. Rather, and to demonstrate 
fluctuations in building versus acquiring, I group the effects of all four problems together and 
analyze their differences as a whole over the four stages of the business cycle.  
Building during early expansion and early contraction stages 
Firms pursuing building strategies face more problems in expansion stages than in 
contraction stages. However, the manifestation of these problems depends on the time horizon 
for firms pursuing building. For example, the quality uncertainty problem is more severe in the 
continuing expansion stage than in any other stages. Yet, when firms bring in novice employees, 
their training and development may overlap with the early contraction stage. Hence, subsequent 
problems of firm-specific HC, team complementarities, and employee motivation are less 
problematic. It is difficult to weigh the overall relevance of the problems in this particular 
scenario, and as such difficult to arrive at a clear theoretical prediction. Therefore, I start my 
analysis with two scenarios that yield clear theoretical predictions: (1) a firm pursues building in 
an early expansion stage, and (2) a firm pursues building in an early contraction stage. 
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In the first scenario, building strategies are, overall, more problematic when firms bring 
in novice employees during the early expansion stage and develop them in the continuing 
expansion stage. Firms face a higher quality uncertainty problem, since the applicant pool 
consists of a mix of lesser quality applicants including those who have been seeking employment 
since the contraction years. Additionally, firms will be developing the novice employee in the 
early expansion and continuing expansion stages, and in both of these stages, firms risk losing 
their trained employee to other firms since ESFs favor the novice employee. Novice employees 
in the early expansion stage have lower ESFs because there are few impediments to searching, 
and they are likely to have increased mobility options in the continuing expansion stage. 
In contrast, building strategies are less problematic when firms bring in novice employees 
in the early contraction stage and develop them in the continuing contraction stage. Firms can 
take advantage of the structural effects of the contraction stages that create high ESFs for novice 
employees, putting them in a weak bargaining position (Devereux, 2002). Novice employees will 
be motivated, due to limited job alternatives, and the firm can induce them to make investments 
in firm-specific HC and team complementarities (Greer, 1984; O'Flaherty & Siow, 1995). 
Therefore, building strategies in an early contraction stage are more favorable to firms compared 
to building strategies in an early expansion stage.     
H1: Ceteris paribus, a firm that pursues building strategies in an early contraction stage 
will generate more positive economic returns than it would pursuing the same strategies 
in an early expansion stage. 
 
As noted, firms face tremendous problems when pursuing HC augmentation strategies 
during early expansion stages, and therefore probably would be better off not pursuing them. 
However, this is unlikely since increasing client demand drives the need for HC. Firms may need 
to utilize their capabilities to address the problems associated with building in the expansion 
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stages. Drawing on these findings from Chapter 2, I hypothesize that firms pursuing building 
strategies in the early expansion stage can increase their economic returns if they also pursue 
their capabilities of firm reputation, promotion chances, and/or prior building experience. 
H2a: Ceteris paribus, the relationship between a firm’s building strategies in an early 
expansion stage and its economic returns is positively moderated by a firm’s reputation. 
 
H2b: Ceteris paribus, the relationship between a firm’s building strategies in an early 
expansion stage and its economic returns is positively moderated by a firm’s promotion 
chances. 
 
H2c: Ceteris paribus, the relationship between a firm’s building strategies in an early 
expansion stage and its economic returns is positively moderated by a firm’s building 
experience. 
 
Acquiring during expansion and contraction sets 
While it was valuable to distinguish between early and continuing stages for building, it 
is less so in the case of acquiring. After completing Table 4.2 and analyzing the differences of 
the four classic problems in the business cycle stages, it is not clear that I could definitively 
hypothesize differences between the early and continuing expansion stages, or between the early 
and continuing contraction stages. For example, the firm-specific HC and team 
complementarities problems are less of an issue in both the early contraction and continuing 
contraction stages. Therefore, I group both contraction stages into a contraction set. Also, since it 
is difficult to distinguish the relevance of the four classic problems in the stages of early 
expansion and continuing expansion, I group them collectively as an expansion set.  
Following from this, I theorize that firms pursuing acquiring strategies during an 
expansion set face greater severity of the four problems than during a contraction set. 
Experienced employees have low ESFs in the expansion set and may subsequently change firms, 
independent of their desire to leave the firm, for the potential to earn higher wages during the 
expansion set (Shimer, 2010); these employees may gain confidence in their abilities and move 
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frequently in this set. As a result, the problems of quality uncertainty, firm-specific HC, team 
complementarities, and employee motivation are overall exacerbated for firms pursuing 
acquiring strategies in the expansion set. 
Alternatively, firms that pursue acquiring strategies during a contraction set face fewer 
problems than those doing so in an expansion set.29 While the quality uncertainty problem 
continues to exist, though to a lesser degree, experienced employees are motivated to work hard 
in order to signal to their employer that they want to remain in the firm (Maister, 1993). Since 
ESFs are high and there are fewer mobility options, experienced employees are more likely to 
invest in firm-specific HC and team complementarities. Therefore, acquiring strategies can 
generate more value in contraction than in expansion sets.  
H3: Ceteris paribus, a firm that pursues acquiring strategies in a contraction set will 
generate more positive economic returns than it would by pursuing the same strategies in 
an expansion set. 
 
Firms can address the problems of quality uncertainty, firm-specific HC, team 
complementarities, and employee motivation by pursuing acquiring strategies in an expansion set 
(see Chapter 2). Essentially, firms that pursue acquiring and offer promotion opportunities, 
pursue external leadership, and/or use their prior acquiring experience can generate economic 
returns in the expansion set. 
H4a: Ceteris paribus, the relationship between a firm’s acquiring strategies in an 
expansion set and its economic returns is positively moderated by a firm’s promotion 
chances. 
 
29 This option though theoretically robust is less likely to be pursued by firms. Firms are often distracted by the 
negative climate in the contraction set to focus on augmentation strategies. Rather, firms may focus on containing 
expenses and conserving cash by rescinding existing offers made or postponing start dates of new employees, to 
weather the contraction period (Foster, et al., 2008; Pearce & Michael, 2006). Eventually, typically in the continuing 
contraction stage, firms are less distracted, and more likely to augment HC. 
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H4b: Ceteris paribus, the relationship between a firm’s acquiring strategies in an 
expansion set and its economic returns is positively moderated by a firm’s external 
leadership. 
 
H4c: Ceteris paribus, the relationship between a firm’s acquiring strategies in an 
expansion set and its economic returns is positively moderated by a firm’s acquiring 
experience. 
 
Data and Variables 
This chapter uses a firm-level panel dataset from the legal industry to assess the impact of 
the business cycle and HC augmentation strategies on a firm’s economic returns. This chapter 
uses a large dataset that I constructed by combining a number of different surveys of the largest 
U.S. law firms (see Appendix B for details on construction of the dataset). This chapter draws on 
the sample and results from Chapter 2, and has a final sample that consists of 148 firms observed 
longitudinally through a single business cycle (see Data and Variables section in Chapter 2 for a 
discussion of these variables). The independent and moderator variables on the dependent 
variable are predicted to have similar effects when controlling for the business cycle, but the 
effects will vary across all the stages of the business cycle. In the next section, I describe how I 
operationalize the four-stage business cycle for building strategies and two-stage business cycle 
for acquiring strategies. 
Four-stage business cycle for building strategies: Following Mascarenhas and Aaker 
(1989), the stages of the business cycle—early expansion, continuing expansion, early 
contraction, and continuing contraction—were coded in binary. The year(s) that a cycle was in a 
particular stage were exclusively coded as 1 when that stage was being analyzed. In Figure B.2, 
we can see that somewhat atypically, early expansion stretches from 2002 through 2003. In 
Table 4.5, 2002 and 2003 were both coded as early expansion. Years 2004 to 2007 were 
subsequently coded 1 to indicate continuing expansion, years 2008 was subsequently coded as 1 
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to indicate early contraction, and 2009 was subsequently coded as 1 to indicate continuing 
contraction. To fit my one year early expansion theoretical assumption, Table 4.6 shows that 
2002 was the only year coded as early expansion and 2003 was included as part of continuing 
expansion. The results were similar in both of these analyses.  
Two-stage business cycle for acquiring strategies: Acquiring strategies are measured by 
the number of lateral mid-level associate attorneys that a firm hires in a given year. The stages of 
the business cycle for acquiring hypotheses is condensed to expansion and contraction since 
theoretically there is little variance within these stages compared to the building case. Expansion 
and contraction were coded in binary, such that for the years a cycle was in a particular stage, 
that stage was exclusively coded as 1 for those years. Figure B.2 shows that prior to 2008, 
acquiring strategies were increasing, and starting in 2008, acquiring strategies were decreasing. 
Therefore, in Table 4.7, expansion was coded as years 2004-2007, and contraction was coded as 
years 2008-2010. I was able to include one additional year of data for the expansion stage, 2003, 
by reducing augmentation experience to one instead of two years. These results found in Table 
4.8 are similar to those found in Table 4.7.  
Model specification: I estimated two fixed effects regression models to test my 
hypotheses—one for building and the other for acquiring. For each model, I reject the null 
hypothesis (p < 0.01) for the Hausman test, and use fixed effects. The first model is the impact of 
the business cycle and a building strategy on ROS. The second model is the impact of the 
business cycle and an acquiring strategy on ROS. The models are similar to those in Chapter 2, 
except that the building and acquiring variables are interacted with the stages of the business 
cycle. The moderator variables are three-way interactions, since the augmentation strategy is 
interacted with the particular year(s) and then with the hypothesized variables. 
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Results 
Table 4.3 shows the descriptive statistics and Table 4.4 shows the correlation table. Not 
surprisingly, law firms augment more HC during expansion than contraction years. In particular, 
firms pursuing building strategies augment most during continuing expansion, followed by early 
expansion, early contraction, and continuing contraction. In the case of acquiring, firms augment 
almost four times more HC in expansion than contraction stages. In essence, firms build and 
acquire HC more during expansion stages to meet the client demand for HC, even though there 
are likely more problems associated with augmenting in this stage compared to expansion stages.  
Table 4.5 shows the results for a building strategy and the business cycle on a firm’s 
ROS. Hypothesis 1 for building posits that a firm pursuing these strategies in early contraction 
stages will generate more economic returns than by pursuing these strategies in early expansion 
stages. The results in Model 1 from Table 4.5 indicate that building strategies pursued in an early 
expansion stage generates negative ROS for the firm (β = -0.399; p < 0.01), but when pursued in 
an early contraction stage, building strategies generate positive ROS for the firm (β = 0.189; p < 
0.1). These results are consistent with Table 4.6 as well. Since the building during early 
expansion coefficient and the building during early contraction coefficient are statistically 
different from one another, I find support for Hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 2a, 2b, and 2c posit collectively that a firm that pursues building strategies in 
early expansion stages can generate more economic returns if they use their capabilities of firm 
reputation (see Model 2 from Table 4.5), promotion chances (see Model 3 from Table 4.5), and 
building experience (see Model 4 from Table 4.5) to address the four classic problems. In 
addition to looking at the significance of the moderator coefficients, it is important to compare 
these moderator coefficients during the early expansion period with that of the early contraction 
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period to accurately test my hypotheses that these factors matter more in early expansions than 
early contractions. Firm reputation as a moderator is not statistically significant during the early 
expansion stage (β = -0.001; p > 0.1), and also not statistically significant during the early 
contraction stage (β = 0.001; p > 0.1). Therefore, Hypothesis 2a is rejected.  
The promotion chances (β = 0.223; p < 0.1) and building experience (β = 0.003; p < 0.1) 
moderators are both positive and statistically significant in the early expansion stage. However, 
in the early contraction stage, the promotion chances coefficient is not significant (β = 0.126; p > 
0.1), while the building experience hypothesis is significant (β = 0.004; p < 0.01). These results 
remain statistically significant in the full model (see Model 5 from Table 4.5) and are consistent 
with findings from Table 4.6. Therefore, promotion chances matters for firms, and more so 
during the early expansion stage than the early contraction stage, and thus I find statistical 
support for Hypothesis 2b. In the case of building experience, this variable matters for firms in 
multiple stages—the variable is significant across all four stages in the business cycle. Therefore, 
I do not find support for Hypothesis 2c that building experience matters more for firms in the 
early expansion stage than in the early contraction stage. 
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 show the results for an acquiring strategy and the two-stage business 
cycle on a firm’s ROS. Hypothesis 3 posits that a firm pursuing acquiring strategies in 
contraction stages will generate more economic returns than by pursuing them in expansion 
stages. In Model 4 from Table 4.7, the coefficient of acquiring during contraction stages is 
positive and statistically significant (β = 0.353; p < 0.1). When including one additional year into 
the model in Table 4.8, the results remain the same (β = 0.254; p < 0.05). However, the 
coefficient of acquiring during expansion stages in Model 1 from both tables is not statistically 
significant. By comparing the coefficient of acquiring during contraction stages with that of 
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acquiring during expansion stages, I find that these are statistically different, and thus find 
support for Hypothesis 3.  
Hypothesis 4a, 4b, and 4c posit that a firm can increase its economic returns when 
pursuing acquiring strategies in expansion stages by using their capabilities. The outcome of a 
firm using its capabilities of promotion chances (H4a), external leadership (H4b), and acquiring 
experience (H4c) is illustrated in Models 2, 3, and 4, respectively, from Table 4.7. Firms do not 
generate economic returns by increasing promotion chances in the expansion stage (β = 0.038; p 
> 0.1) nor in the contraction stage (β = 0.006; p > 0.1), therefore Hypothesis 4a is rejected. Firms 
can generate economic returns by having external leaders (β = 0.008; p < 0.01) and acquiring 
experience (β = 0.002; p < 0.01). The coefficients of these capabilities are diminished in the full 
model, but remain statistically significant. I find that firms cannot generate economic returns by 
having external leadership in the contraction stage (β = 0.006; p > 0.1), but can generate returns 
with building experience in the contraction stage (β = 0.005; p < 0.01). In Table 4.8, the results 
are the same for external leadership, but they disappear for acquiring experience. Therefore, I 
find support for Hypothesis 4b and no support for Hypothesis 4c. Similar to the problems of 
pursuing building strategies in the early expansion stage, firms can address the problems of 
pursuing acquiring strategies in the expansion stage by using their capabilities. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
This chapter extends Chapter 2 by including the impact of a business cycle on generating 
economic returns from the strategies of building and acquiring. I identify employee search 
frictions as the key mechanism that helps distinguish between the stages of the business cycle. 
The results suggest that firms can generate economic returns by pursuing building in an early 
contraction stage because the manifestation of the four problems is less of an issue. Firms can 
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also generate economic returns by pursue building in the early expansion stage if they can use 
their capabilities of offering promotion chances to address the four classic problems, which are 
likely more of an issue in this particular stage. Other capabilities matter less during the business 
cycle stages, such as firm reputation, while other capabilities matter more across all business 
cycle stages, such as building experience. 
A firm that pursues acquiring strategies in a contraction set is more likely to generate 
economic returns than if it pursues these strategies in an expansion set. However, a firm can also 
generate economic returns in the expansion if it can address the problems associated with 
pursuing acquiring strategies in the expansion stage, i.e., by using capabilities of external 
leadership. Firms that have experience with acquiring and pursue acquiring strategies can 
generate economic returns in any stage of the business cycle. However, firms offering promotion 
chances when pursuing acquiring strategies do not gain any additional advantages in the business 
cycle stages. In sum, this chapter shows that firms may be able to generate a competitive 
advantage from HC augmentation strategies by simply pursuing them in contraction stages, or by 
pursuing them in expansion stages and using their capabilities. 
The major limitation of this study is that I use one business cycle for my analysis. For this 
study to be more robust, I would need to include more business cycles into my analysis. One way 
to address this concern is to update the dataset to include more years. Also, firms often pursue 
other strategies that may be more short-term oriented, such as temporary hires or contract hires, 
and including those variables in this analysis would provide a more complete picture of a firm’s 
HC augmentation strategies (Lepak & Snell, 1999). Another limitation of this research is my 
measure of the business cycle stages is categorical. An alternative would be to use some 
continuous measure, such as the volume of legal work in the industry, and to use the changes in 
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these levels to map onto the business cycle. Finally, I use a macroeconomic theory of ESFs to 
explain microeconomic phenomena. While this has been suggested to be appropriate in prior 
research (Rogerson, et al., 2005), it may be incorrect, in which case I would need to search for a 
microeconomic theory that helps explain the business cycle phenomena. 
The major contribution of this study is that I am able to study the business cycle in the 
context of firms pursuing building and acquiring strategies. Studying the business cycle has been 
an empirical challenge, since using years to measure each stage can bring in multiple variables 
that are difficult to control for. In my context, I control for the years and then use the years as a 
moderator variable (in which case my analysis of the capability variables are three-way-
interactions). Employee search frictions is the key mechanism that helps differentiate the 
multiple business cycle stages across these two augmentation strategies and the four classic 
problems. By distinguishing among the four stages of the business cycle, this study provides 
further insights into when managers can generate value by pursuing HC augmentation strategies.  
In terms of future research, instead of studying augmentation decisions, studying other 
variables may help me to take advantage of the complete legal data set, which currently includes 
three business cycles since 1984. For example, an interesting question to consider is how firms 
shuffle in their ranks during the business cycle. Anecdotally, lower-ranked firms have been 
known to have used the contraction stages to rise in the ranks. In 1920, Ford was outselling 
Chevrolet by a large margin, but after the Great Depression when Ford struggled with expending 
resources, Chevrolet was able to expend certain resources and climb to the top rank in only a few 
years. In this regard, the business cycle, and specifically the contraction stages, is a platform for 
firms to quickly climb in the ranks of top performers in the industry. In the legal context, some of 
the most renowned law firms, e.g., Howrey, failed in the recent contraction stage. It would be 
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interesting to study how such a large law firm became so vulnerable to the business cycle. As a 
robustness check, I included financial slack from Chapter 3 as a control variable, since a firm’s 
ability to pursue augmentation strategies during the contraction stage may be driven by their 
financial resources. However, I do not find any statistical significance for this variable or 
changes in the three-way interacted contraction variables. 
Other areas of future research include overcoming empirical challenges with studying HC 
in the context of the business cycle. This article identifies the causal linkages between 
augmentation and ROS across the business cycle, but clearly measuring the four problems (e.g., 
quality uncertainty, firm-specific HC, team complementarities, and employee motivation) is 
necessary in my future work. Also, distinguishing the competency of HC augmented during the 
business cycle matters. Currently, I assume homogeneity of employees in augmentation, but 
heterogeneity naturally exists, and how does this heterogeneity vary across the business cycle is 
an important extension of this work. Firms may have difficulty finding competent HC during the 
contraction than during the expansion years, which can explain why there is fewer augmentation 
overall in these stages. Another extension to this work is in understanding how firms may renege 
on their implicit contracts with their employees if the firm faces financial difficulties. Pontiff, 
Shleifer, and Weisbach (1990) suggest that firms can survive economic contractions by reneging 
on promises in previous implicit contracts (i.e., pension funds).  
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nt
ra
ct
io
n,
 
si
nc
e 
th
er
e 
m
ay
 b
e 
fir
m
s 
se
ek
in
g 
to
 
hi
re
 
co
un
te
rc
yc
lic
al
ly
, 
an
d 
th
es
e 
no
vi
ce
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
m
ay
 b
e 
tra
in
ed
 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
io
n 
st
ag
es
 a
nd
 
ha
ve
 
be
tte
r 
m
ob
ili
ty
 
op
tio
ns
 
in
 
an
tic
ip
at
io
n 
of
 e
ar
ly
 e
xp
an
si
on
. 
Quality uncertainty problem 
M
ed
iu
m
 
V
er
y 
H
ig
h 
M
ed
iu
m
 
Lo
w
 
Fi
rm
s h
iri
ng
 ri
gh
t a
fte
r t
he
 
co
nt
ra
ct
io
n 
ye
ar
s h
av
e 
a 
la
rg
e 
ap
pl
ic
an
t p
oo
l t
ha
t c
on
si
st
s o
f n
ew
 
an
d 
pr
ev
io
us
 y
ea
rs
' g
ra
du
at
es
. T
he
 
gr
ad
ua
te
s f
ro
m
 p
re
vi
ou
s y
ea
rs
 
m
ig
ht
 b
rin
g 
do
w
n 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
qu
al
ity
 o
f a
pp
lic
an
ts
, s
in
ce
 th
e 
hi
gh
er
 q
ua
lit
y 
gr
ad
ua
te
s f
ro
m
 
pr
ev
io
us
 y
ea
rs
 w
ou
ld
 p
re
su
m
ab
ly
 
al
re
ad
y 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
hi
re
d;
 o
r t
he
y 
m
ay
 ra
is
e 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
qu
al
ity
 si
nc
e 
fir
m
s m
ay
 h
av
e 
a 
st
ro
ng
 ta
le
nt
 p
oo
l 
of
 a
pp
lic
an
ts
 w
ho
 m
ay
 n
ot
 h
av
e 
be
en
 p
re
vi
ou
sl
y 
re
co
gn
iz
ed
. 
Fi
rm
s d
es
pe
ra
te
ly
 n
ee
d 
no
vi
ce
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s a
nd
 m
ay
 o
ff
er
 a
ty
pi
ca
lly
 
at
tra
ct
iv
e 
pa
ck
ag
es
, t
ho
ug
h 
th
ey
 
w
ill
 n
ot
 b
e 
pr
of
ita
bl
e 
fo
r t
he
 fi
rm
 
til
l p
er
ha
ps
 m
an
y 
ye
ar
s l
at
er
. T
he
re
 
ar
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 b
e 
fe
w
er
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s i
n 
th
e 
ap
pl
ic
an
t p
oo
l, 
si
nc
e 
in
 g
en
er
al
, 
un
iv
er
si
tie
s h
av
e 
a 
fix
ed
 n
um
be
r o
f 
gr
ad
ua
tin
g 
st
ud
en
ts
 a
nd
 th
e 
in
du
st
ry
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
hi
rin
g 
ex
ce
ss
iv
el
y 
si
nc
e 
th
e 
ea
rly
 
ex
pa
ns
io
n 
st
ag
e.
 
Si
nc
e 
ov
er
al
l f
irm
s a
re
 h
iri
ng
 m
uc
h 
le
ss
, f
irm
s t
ha
t d
o 
hi
re
 g
en
er
al
ly
 
ca
n 
be
 se
le
ct
iv
e 
bu
t t
he
 p
oo
l l
ik
el
y 
co
ns
is
ts
 o
f r
ec
en
t g
ra
du
at
es
 w
ho
 
ha
ve
 n
ot
 y
et
 b
ee
n 
hi
re
d 
an
d 
pr
ev
io
us
 y
ea
rs
' g
ra
du
at
es
, i
f a
ny
, 
w
ho
 a
re
 li
ke
ly
 to
 b
e 
of
 lo
w
er
 
qu
al
ity
. T
he
 n
om
in
al
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 th
e 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f l
ow
er
 q
ua
lit
y 
ap
pl
ic
an
ts
 m
ay
 b
e 
m
iti
ga
te
d 
by
 th
e 
fa
ct
 th
at
 c
er
ta
in
 n
um
be
rs
 o
f s
til
l, 
as
 
ye
t, 
un
-h
ire
d 
ap
pl
ic
an
ts
 a
re
 g
oi
ng
 
to
 le
av
e 
th
e 
in
du
st
ry
. 
M
an
y 
un
em
pl
oy
ed
 re
ce
nt
 g
ra
du
at
es
 
fr
om
 p
rio
r y
ea
rs
 a
re
 b
ei
ng
 c
ar
rie
d 
ov
er
 in
to
 th
e 
la
bo
r m
ar
ke
t i
n 
th
is
 
st
ag
e,
 su
gg
es
tin
g 
an
 e
xc
es
s o
f 
hi
gh
ly
 c
re
de
nt
ia
le
d 
ap
pl
ic
an
ts
 a
nd
 
th
at
 fi
rm
s c
an
 b
e 
m
or
e 
se
le
ct
iv
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
fe
w
 p
os
iti
on
s t
he
y 
ar
e 
lo
ok
in
g 
to
 fi
ll.
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1:
 P
ro
bl
em
 le
ve
ls
 fo
r b
ui
ld
in
g 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
  
Ea
rl
y 
ex
pa
ns
io
n 
(~
 1
 y
ea
r)
 
C
on
tin
ui
ng
 e
xp
an
sio
n 
(>
 1
 y
ea
r)
 
Ea
rl
y 
co
nt
ra
ct
io
n 
(~
 1
 y
ea
r)
 
C
on
tin
ui
ng
 c
on
tr
ac
tio
n 
(>
 1
 y
ea
r)
 
Firm-specific HC problem 
V
er
y 
H
ig
h 
H
ig
h 
V
er
y 
Lo
w
 
Lo
w
 
N
ov
ic
e 
em
pl
oy
ee
s t
ha
t a
re
 in
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t a
re
 le
ss
 li
ke
ly
 to
 
de
ve
lo
p 
fir
m
-s
pe
ci
fic
 H
C
 b
ec
au
se
 
th
ey
 w
an
t t
o 
ha
ve
 m
ob
ili
ty
 o
pt
io
ns
 
ac
ro
ss
 fi
rm
s i
n 
th
e 
co
nt
in
ui
ng
 
ex
pa
ns
io
n 
st
ag
e.
 
N
ov
ic
e 
em
pl
oy
ee
s r
em
ai
n 
le
ss
 
lik
el
y 
to
 d
ev
el
op
 fi
rm
-s
pe
ci
fic
 H
C
 
in
 o
rd
er
 to
 c
on
tin
ue
 to
 h
av
e 
m
ob
ili
ty
 o
pt
io
ns
. H
ow
ev
er
, s
om
e 
em
pl
oy
ee
s, 
kn
ow
in
g 
th
at
 th
ey
 m
ay
 
so
on
 b
e 
en
te
rin
g 
co
nt
ra
ct
io
n 
st
ag
es
, 
m
ay
 w
an
t t
o 
in
ve
st
 in
 fi
rm
-s
pe
ci
fic
 
H
C
 to
 re
m
ai
n 
em
pl
oy
ed
 in
 th
e 
up
co
m
in
g 
co
nt
ra
ct
io
n 
st
ag
es
. 
Em
pl
oy
ee
s a
re
 m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 
de
ve
lo
p 
fir
m
-s
pe
ci
fic
 H
C
 b
ec
au
se
 
th
ey
 h
av
e 
fe
w
er
 m
ob
ili
ty
 o
pt
io
ns
. 
O
ve
ra
ll,
 fe
w
 fi
rm
s a
re
 h
iri
ng
 in
 th
is
 
st
ag
e.
 In
 o
rd
er
 fo
r e
m
pl
oy
ee
s t
o 
br
in
g 
va
lu
e 
to
 th
ei
r f
irm
 in
 th
is
 
st
ag
e,
 a
nd
 th
us
 re
m
ai
n 
em
pl
oy
ed
, 
th
ey
 m
ay
 n
ee
d 
to
 d
ev
el
op
 fi
rm
-
sp
ec
ifi
c 
H
C
. 
Fi
rm
s h
av
e 
ha
d 
tim
e 
to
 re
ac
t t
o 
th
e 
bu
si
ne
ss
 c
yc
le
, e
.g
., 
la
yi
ng
 o
ff
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s o
r h
iri
ng
 c
ou
nt
er
-
cy
cl
ic
al
ly
, a
nd
 so
 n
ov
ic
e 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
in
 th
is
 st
ag
e 
ar
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 in
ve
st
 in
 
fir
m
-s
pe
ci
fic
 H
C
 to
 si
gn
al
 th
at
 th
ey
 
w
an
t t
o 
co
nt
in
ue
 to
 re
m
ai
n 
in
 th
e 
fir
m
. 
Team complementarities problem 
V
er
y 
H
ig
h 
V
er
y 
H
ig
h 
V
er
y 
Lo
w
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
Si
nc
e 
th
es
e 
em
pl
oy
ee
s a
re
 le
ss
 
in
ve
st
ed
 in
 th
e 
fir
m
, i
.e
., 
th
e 
fir
m
-
sp
ec
ifi
c 
H
C
 p
ro
bl
em
 is
 v
er
y 
hi
gh
, i
t 
is
 v
er
y 
di
ff
ic
ul
t t
o 
bu
ild
 a
nd
 
m
ai
nt
ai
n 
a 
te
am
. T
ra
in
ed
 n
ov
ic
e 
em
pl
oy
ee
s w
ill
 h
av
e 
m
an
y 
m
ob
ili
ty
 
op
tio
ns
 b
ec
au
se
 o
f t
he
 
op
po
rtu
ni
tie
s i
n 
th
e 
up
co
m
in
g 
co
nt
in
ui
ng
 e
xp
an
si
on
, a
nd
 b
e 
w
ill
in
g 
to
 le
av
e 
th
ei
r t
ea
m
 th
at
 th
ey
 
w
er
e 
le
ss
 in
ve
st
ed
 in
 to
 b
eg
in
 w
ith
. 
A
ga
in
, i
t m
ay
 b
e 
di
ff
ic
ul
t t
o 
m
ai
nt
ai
n 
te
am
s i
n 
th
is
 st
ag
e,
 si
nc
e 
no
vi
ce
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s a
re
 le
ss
 li
ke
ly
 to
 
w
an
t t
o 
tie
 th
em
se
lv
es
 in
 w
ith
in
 a
 
te
am
 st
ru
ct
ur
e 
th
at
 li
m
its
 th
ei
r 
su
bs
eq
ue
nt
 m
ob
ili
ty
. A
ls
o,
 it
 m
ay
 
be
 d
iff
ic
ul
t t
o 
fin
d 
th
e 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
to
 fo
rm
 su
ch
 a
 
co
m
pl
em
en
ta
ry
 te
am
 b
ec
au
se
 o
f t
he
 
sh
rin
ki
ng
 a
pp
lic
an
t p
oo
l. 
B
ui
ld
in
g 
an
d 
m
ai
nt
ai
ni
ng
 te
am
s i
s 
ea
si
er
 si
nc
e 
no
vi
ce
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s a
re
 
m
ot
iv
at
ed
 to
 st
ic
k 
to
ge
th
er
 b
ec
au
se
 
of
 fe
w
er
 m
ob
ili
ty
 o
pt
io
ns
 
el
se
w
he
re
. N
ov
ic
e 
em
pl
oy
ee
s k
no
w
 
th
at
 th
ey
 w
ill
 n
ot
 h
av
e 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
l 
m
ob
ili
ty
 o
pt
io
ns
 in
 c
on
tra
ct
io
n 
st
ag
es
, s
o 
th
ey
 m
ay
 b
e 
m
or
e 
w
ill
in
g 
to
 in
ve
st
 in
 th
ei
r t
ea
m
, s
in
ce
 d
oi
ng
 
so
 d
oe
s n
ot
 e
ffe
ct
iv
el
y 
co
m
e 
w
ith
 
an
y 
m
ob
ili
ty
 c
os
ts
. 
W
hi
le
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s h
av
e 
an
 in
te
re
st
 
in
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
an
d 
m
ai
nt
ai
ni
ng
 te
am
 
co
m
pl
em
en
ta
rit
ie
s, 
fir
m
s m
ay
 b
e 
in
ad
ve
rte
nt
ly
 c
ha
ng
in
g 
th
e 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
of
 th
e 
te
am
 b
y 
re
ac
tin
g 
to
 th
e 
bu
si
ne
ss
 c
yc
le
, e
.g
., 
re
du
ci
ng
 th
ei
r 
st
af
f. 
A
ls
o,
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s k
no
w
 th
at
 
th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
io
n 
st
ag
e 
w
ill
 b
e 
en
di
ng
, a
nd
 in
 o
rd
er
 to
 m
ai
nt
ai
n 
th
ei
r m
ob
ili
ty
 o
pt
io
ns
, m
ay
 n
ot
 
in
ve
st
 in
 th
ei
r t
ea
m
. 
Employee motivation problem 
V
er
y 
H
ig
h 
M
ed
iu
m
 
V
er
y 
Lo
w
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
N
ov
ic
e 
em
pl
oy
ee
s l
ik
el
y 
ch
os
e 
th
e 
fir
m
 th
at
 w
as
 a
va
ila
bl
e,
 in
 w
hi
ch
 
ca
se
, m
ot
iv
at
in
g 
su
ch
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s i
s 
ex
tre
m
el
y 
ch
al
le
ng
in
g.
 T
he
re
 is
 le
ss
 
lo
ya
lty
 to
 th
e 
fir
m
 to
 b
eg
in
 w
ith
 
an
d 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
al
so
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 
m
ob
ili
ty
 o
pt
io
ns
 fo
r t
he
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
 
in
 th
is
 st
ag
e.
 
Fo
llo
w
in
g 
on
 fr
om
 th
e 
ea
rly
 
ex
pa
ns
io
n 
st
ag
e,
 n
ov
ic
e 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
ar
e 
al
so
 a
w
ar
e 
th
at
 a
 c
on
tra
ct
io
n 
st
ag
e 
w
ill
 b
e 
co
m
in
g.
 T
he
re
fo
re
, 
th
ey
 m
ay
 b
e 
m
ot
iv
at
ed
 a
nd
 w
ill
 
si
gn
al
 th
is
 to
 th
ei
r f
irm
 so
 th
at
 th
e 
fir
m
 b
ec
om
es
 a
w
ar
e 
of
 th
e 
em
pl
oy
ee
’s
 im
po
rta
nc
e 
in
 o
rd
er
 fo
r 
th
e 
em
pl
oy
ee
 to
 re
m
ai
n 
em
pl
oy
ed
 
in
 th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
io
n 
st
ag
es
. 
N
ov
ic
e 
em
pl
oy
ee
s a
re
 st
ro
ng
ly
 
m
ot
iv
at
ed
 to
 re
m
ai
n 
at
 th
e 
fir
m
 
be
ca
us
e 
of
 fe
w
er
 m
ob
ili
ty
 o
pt
io
ns
, 
an
d 
so
 n
ee
d 
to
 si
gn
al
 th
ei
r v
al
ue
 to
 
th
e 
fir
m
, o
th
er
w
is
e,
 th
ey
 a
re
 li
ke
ly
 
to
 b
e 
am
on
g 
th
e 
fir
st
 to
 b
e 
le
t g
o.
 
So
m
e 
no
vi
ce
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s a
re
 li
ke
ly
 
to
 w
or
k 
ha
rd
 to
 sh
ow
 th
ei
r 
im
po
rta
nc
e 
to
 th
e 
fir
m
, h
ow
ev
er
, i
f 
th
e 
fir
m
 is
 p
er
ce
iv
ed
 to
 b
e 
fir
in
g 
in
di
sc
rim
in
at
el
y,
 th
en
 n
ov
ic
e 
em
pl
oy
ee
s’
 m
ot
iv
at
io
n 
w
ill
 li
ke
ly
 
su
ff
er
. 
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2:
 P
ro
bl
em
 le
ve
ls
 fo
r a
cq
ui
rin
g 
  
Ea
rl
y 
ex
pa
ns
io
n 
(~
 1
 y
ea
r)
 
C
on
tin
ui
ng
 e
xp
an
sio
n 
(>
 1
 y
ea
r)
 
Ea
rl
y 
co
nt
ra
ct
io
n 
(~
 1
 y
ea
r)
 
C
on
tin
ui
ng
 c
on
tr
ac
tio
n 
(>
 1
 y
ea
r)
 
ESFs for experienced 
employees 
Lo
w
 
V
er
y 
Lo
w
 
H
ig
h 
V
er
y 
H
ig
h 
Ex
pe
rie
nc
ed
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
ar
e 
st
ar
tin
g 
to
 g
et
 o
pt
io
ns
 t
o 
m
ov
e 
to
 o
th
er
 
fir
m
s, 
bu
t a
re
 c
om
pe
tin
g 
w
ith
 o
th
er
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
w
ho
 
w
er
e 
st
ru
gg
lin
g 
w
ith
 
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
re
ce
ss
io
n.
 
W
ith
 th
e 
la
bo
r 
m
ar
ke
t g
ro
w
in
g 
th
in
 
an
d 
w
ith
 p
os
si
bl
e 
in
flu
xe
s 
of
 H
C
 
fr
om
 
ot
he
r 
in
du
st
rie
s 
w
ho
 
la
ck
 
in
du
st
ry
 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e,
 
ex
pe
rie
nc
ed
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
w
ith
in
 th
e 
in
du
st
ry
 h
av
e 
hi
gh
er
 b
ar
ga
in
in
g 
po
w
er
 a
nd
 c
an
 
ea
rn
 h
ig
he
r 
in
co
m
e 
if 
th
ey
 m
ov
e 
be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
 c
an
 d
el
iv
er
 v
al
ue
 t
o 
fir
m
s a
lm
os
t i
m
m
ed
ia
te
ly
. 
Ex
pe
rie
nc
ed
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
ar
e 
le
ss
 
lik
el
y 
to
 m
ov
e 
un
le
ss
 th
ey
 fe
el
 th
ey
 
ca
n 
de
liv
er
 v
al
ue
 to
 th
ei
r 
ne
w
 fi
rm
, 
bu
t 
ar
e 
st
ill
 
de
si
re
d 
si
nc
e 
fir
m
s 
w
on
de
r 
if 
th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
io
n 
st
ag
e 
co
ul
d 
be
 
a 
flu
ke
 
an
d 
w
an
t 
to
 
co
nt
in
ue
 
th
ei
r 
bu
si
ne
ss
 
pr
ac
tic
es
, 
i.e
., 
de
liv
er
 
hi
gh
 
va
lu
e 
to
 
th
ei
r 
cl
ie
nt
s 
un
til
 
th
ei
r 
cl
ie
nt
s 
st
op
 
se
ek
in
g 
th
em
. 
C
lie
nt
 
bu
si
ne
ss
 
is
 
lo
w
, 
so
 
ex
pe
rie
nc
ed
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
ha
ve
 f
ew
er
 
m
ob
ili
ty
 o
pt
io
ns
, 
bu
t 
ra
th
er
 t
ry
 t
o 
re
m
ai
n 
at
 t
he
ir 
cu
rr
en
t 
fir
m
 t
ill
 t
he
 
ex
pa
ns
io
n 
st
ag
e-
re
la
te
d 
op
po
rtu
ni
tie
s 
ar
riv
e.
 T
he
re
 i
s 
al
so
 
le
ss
 
jo
b 
se
cu
rit
y 
at
 
ot
he
r 
fir
m
s 
si
nc
e,
 f
irm
s 
m
ay
 b
e 
fa
ili
ng
 a
t 
th
is
 
tim
e 
as
 w
el
l. 
Quality uncertainty problem 
H
ig
h 
V
er
y 
H
ig
h 
M
ed
iu
m
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
Fi
rm
s n
ee
d 
ex
pe
rie
nc
ed
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
an
d 
m
ay
 se
ek
 th
em
 if
 th
ey
 a
re
 o
f 
ac
ce
pt
ab
le
 q
ua
lit
y;
 h
ow
ev
er
, (
1)
 th
e 
ad
ve
rs
e 
se
le
ct
io
n 
pr
ob
le
m
 is
 m
or
e 
in
te
ns
e,
 a
nd
 (2
) t
he
y 
ca
n 
ea
si
ly
 
m
ov
e 
to
 a
no
th
er
 fi
rm
 in
 th
is
 
ex
pa
ns
io
n 
st
ag
e.
 
Fi
rm
s a
re
 q
ui
te
 v
ul
ne
ra
bl
e 
w
he
n 
pu
rs
ui
ng
 a
cq
ui
rin
g 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 in
 th
is
 
st
ag
e.
 T
he
y 
m
ay
 p
ay
 a
cq
ui
re
d 
ex
pe
rie
nc
ed
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
 h
ig
he
r 
sa
la
rie
s, 
ev
en
 th
ou
gh
 th
e 
ad
ve
rs
e 
se
le
ct
io
n 
pr
ob
le
m
 is
 q
ui
te
 se
ve
re
. 
D
es
pi
te
 th
ei
r h
ig
he
r s
al
ar
ie
s, 
th
es
e 
em
pl
oy
ee
s m
ay
 n
ot
 d
el
iv
er
 a
ny
 
fu
tu
re
 v
al
ue
 to
 th
e 
fir
m
 a
nd
 c
an
 
m
ov
e 
ea
si
ly
 to
 o
th
er
 fi
rm
s w
ith
 
va
ca
nc
ie
s. 
D
ue
 to
 b
ei
ng
 d
is
tra
ct
ed
 b
y 
th
is
 
st
ag
e,
 fi
rm
s m
ay
 h
av
e 
de
cr
ea
se
d 
de
si
re
 fo
r e
xp
er
ie
nc
ed
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s. 
If
 a
cq
ui
re
d 
ho
w
ev
er
, f
irm
s c
an
 g
et
 
va
lu
e 
fr
om
 p
os
si
bl
y 
ge
tti
ng
 n
ew
 
cl
ie
nt
s t
ha
t c
an
 h
el
p 
w
ea
th
er
 th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
io
n 
st
ag
es
. 
Fi
rm
s a
re
 le
ss
 li
ke
ly
 to
 p
ay
 to
 b
rin
g 
in
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
ed
 e
m
pl
oy
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics  
  Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      overall between within     
(1) Return on sales (2 years later) 371.78 86.22 88.81 29.15 95 676 
(2) Return on sales (1 year later) 371.21 82.49 82.12 28.33 123 676 
(3) Building (Early expansion) 8.42 24.58 10.27 22.20 0 302 
(4) Building (Continuing expansion) 24.69 35.30 20.94 28.90 0 231 
(5) Building (Early contraction) 7.25 24.04 10.71 22.40 0 250 
(6) Building (Continuing contraction) 5.95 20.89 9.16 19.53 0 158 
(7) Acquiring (Expansion) 27.00 38.49 28.13 27.54 0 276 
(8) Acquiring (Contraction) 7.56 20.45 10.22 18.27 0 222 
(9) Firm reputation 20.14 27.90 20.30 19.54 1 265 
(10) Promotion chances 3.04 0.57 0.47 0.34 1.13 4.84 
(11) External leadership (1 year prior) 11.07 12.93 10.12 7.66 0 122 
(12) External leadership (same year) 11.63 12.74 9.90 7.44 0 95 
(13) Building experience 89.78 70.70 66.11 19.42 7 443 
(14) Acquiring experience 76.15 70.55 62.80 26.67 3 461 
(15) Leverage ratio 1.59 0.90 0.86 0.14 0 5 
(16) Total attorneys 623.33 393.96 379.02 61.95 169 2524 
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Table 4.5: Fixed effects model of a building strategy on ROS during a business cycle (2002-
2009), with early expansion years 2002 and 2003 
 
 
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) 
Building (Early expansion) -0.399*** -0.395*** -0.975*** -0.774*** -1.396*** 
  (0.109) (0.122) (0.358) (0.279) (0.434) 
Building (Early contraction) 0.189 0.144 -0.162 -0.423 -0.973** 
  (0.122) (0.170) (0.357) (0.278) (0.495) 
Building (Early expansion) X  
     Firm reputation  
  -0.001 
  
-0.001 
  (0.004) 
  
(0.004) 
Building (Early expansion) X  
     Promotion chances  
  
 
0.223* 
 
0.246* 
  
 
(0.132) 
 
(0.132) 
Building (Early expansion) X  
     Building experience  
  
  
0.003* 0.003* 
  
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Building (Continuing expansion) -0.0139 -0.084 -0.414 -0.672*** -1.056** 
  (0.113) (0.140) (0.340) (0.246) (0.413) 
Building (Continuing contraction) 
  
0.280** 0.244 -0.23 -0.590** -1.186* 
(0.130) (0.197) (0.511) (0.287) (0.635) 
Building (Continuing expansion)  
     X Firm reputation  
  0.00175 
  
-0.001 
  (0.002) 
  
(0.002) 
Building (Early contraction) X  
     Firm reputation  
  0.001 
  
-0.002 
  (0.002) 
  
(0.002) 
Building (Continuing contraction)  
     X Firm reputation  
  0.001 
  
-0.00321 
  (0.002) 
  
(0.003) 
Building (Continuing expansion)  
     X Promotion chances  
  
 
0.148 
 
0.135 
  
 
(0.114) 
 
(0.114) 
Building (Early contraction) X  
     Promotion chances  
  
 
0.126 
 
0.162 
  
 
(0.120) 
 
(0.125) 
Building (Continuing contraction)  
     X Promotion chances  
  
 
0.176 
 
0.202 
  
 
(0.165) 
 
(0.171) 
Building (Continuing expansion)  
     X Building experience  
  
  
0.004*** 0.004*** 
  
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Building (Early contraction) X  
     Building experience  
  
  
0.003*** 0.004*** 
  
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Building (Continuing contraction)  
     X Building experience  
  
  
0.004*** 0.005*** 
  
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Firm reputation -0.055 -0.145 -0.066 -0.021 0.151 
  (0.080) (0.183) (0.082) (0.081) (0.210) 
Promotion chances -5.199 -5.203 -11.56** -4.444 -11.26** 
  (3.437) (3.450) (5.159) (3.410) (5.118) 
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Table 4.5: Fixed effects model of a building strategy on ROS during a business cycle (2002-
2009), with early expansion years 2002 and 2003 (continued)  
 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) 
External leadership (1 year prior) -0.076 -0.071 -0.082 -0.039 -0.045 
  (0.154) (0.155) (0.155) (0.154) (0.155) 
Building experience -0.103 -0.098 -0.108 -0.425*** -0.457*** 
  (0.074) (0.074) (0.075) (0.126) (0.130) 
Acquiring strategy 0.015 0.023 0.023 -0.001 0.014 
  (0.076) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.078) 
Leverage ratio -0.105 -0.259 -0.171 7.966 9.276 
  (9.361) (9.444) (9.381) (9.630) (9.793) 
Total attorneys 0.006 0.006 0.003 -0.003 -0.008 
  (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Constant 419.4*** 419.5*** 437.6*** 437.0*** 455.3*** 
  (24.12) (24.56) (26.87) (24.79) (27.61) 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects (2002-2009) YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 704 704 704 704 704 
Firms 148 148 148 148 148 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.154 0.151 0.154 0.173 0.175 
Akaike Information Criterion 6646 6653 6650 6634 6641 
F-test 6.445 5.278 5.409 6.082 4.679 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01 
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Table 4.6: Fixed effects model of a building strategy on ROS during a business cycle (2002-
2009), with early expansion year 2002 and continuing expansion year 2003 
 
 
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) 
Building (Early expansion) -0.424*** -0.442*** -0.995** -0.892** -1.449*** 
  (0.118) (0.125) (0.403) (0.361) (0.476) 
Building (Early contraction) 0.188 0.162 -0.233 -0.382 -1.009** 
  (0.126) (0.174) (0.362) (0.282) (0.504) 
Building (Early expansion) X Firm  
     reputation  
  0.002 
  
-0.005 
  (0.013) 
  
(0.013) 
Building (Early expansion) X  
     Promotion chances  
  
 
0.217 
 
0.258 
  
 
(0.149) 
 
(0.159) 
Building (Early expansion) X    
     Building experience  
  
  
0.003* 0.003 
  
  
(0.002) (0.002) 
Building (Continuing expansion) -0.0519 -0.112 -0.584* -0.601** -1.157*** 
  (0.114) (0.142) (0.341) (0.246) (0.419) 
Building (Continuing contraction) 0.299** 0.28 -0.275 -0.525* -1.157* 
  (0.134) (0.200) (0.519) (0.290) (0.644) 
Building (Continuing expansion)  
     X Firm reputation  
  0.00173 
  
-0.001 
  (0.002) 
  
(0.003) 
Building (Early contraction) X  
     Firm reputation  
  0.001 
  
-0.003 
  (0.002) 
  
(0.003) 
Building (Continuing contraction)  
     X Firm reputation  
  0.001 
  
-0.00379 
  (0.002) 
  
(0.003) 
Building (Continuing expansion)  
     X Promotion chances  
  
 
0.196* 
 
0.193* 
  
 
(0.115) 
 
(0.115) 
Building (Early contraction) X  
     Promotion chances  
  
 
0.149 
 
0.186 
  
 
(0.121) 
 
(0.127) 
Building (Continuing contraction)  
     X Promotion chances  
  
 
0.195 
 
0.218 
  
 
(0.166) 
 
(0.173) 
Building (Continuing expansion)  
     X Building experience  
  
  
0.003*** 0.004*** 
  
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Building (Early contraction) X  
     Building experience  
  
  
0.003*** 0.004*** 
  
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Building (Continuing contraction)  
     X Building experience  
  
  
0.004*** 0.005*** 
  
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Firm reputation -0.037 -0.122 -0.052 0.000 0.207 
  (0.080) (0.186) (0.083) (0.081) (0.217) 
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Table 4.6: Fixed effects model of a building strategy on ROS during a business cycle (2002-
2009), with early expansion year 2002 and continuing expansion year 2003 
(continued) 
 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) 
Promotion chances -5.400 -5.434 -12.60** -4.681 -12.33** 
  (3.462) (3.475) (5.229) (3.452) (5.202) 
External leadership (1 year prior) -0.100 -0.091 -0.094 -0.081 -0.068 
  (0.155) (0.156) (0.156) (0.154) (0.156) 
Building experience -0.135* -0.129* -0.138* -0.454*** -0.491*** 
  (0.074) (0.075) (0.075) (0.127) (0.133) 
Acquiring strategy 0.032 0.034 0.036 0.017 0.022 
  (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.078) 
Leverage ratio -0.532 -1.056 -0.724 8.183 9.174 
  (9.429) (9.498) (9.450) (9.696) (9.821) 
Total attorneys 0.013 0.013 0.009 0.006 -0.001 
  (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Constant 420.9*** 422.0*** 442.9*** 438.6*** 460.8*** 
  (24.85) (25.14) (27.74) (25.93) (29.00) 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects (2002-2009) YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 704 704 704 704 704 
Firms 148 148 148 148 148 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.144 0.140 0.145 0.158 0.160 
Akaike Information Criterion 6655 6662 6658 6647 6653 
F-test 5.994 4.901 5.067 5.536 4.312 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01 
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Table 4.7: Fixed effects model of an acquiring strategy on ROS during a business cycle (2004-
2010) 
 
  (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) 
Acquiring (Expansion) -0.048 -0.154 -0.199** -0.239* -0.300 
  (0.080) (0.288) (0.095) (0.123) (0.303) 
Acquiring (Contraction) 0.353* 0.341 0.375 -0.147 -0.663 
  (0.199) (0.873) (0.298) (0.284) (0.965) 
Acquiring (Expansion) X  
     Promotion chances  
  0.0383 
  
0.015 
  (0.099) 
  
(0.100) 
Acquiring (Expansion) X  
     External leaders (same year)  
  
 
0.008*** 
 
0.005* 
  
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
Acquiring (Expansion) X  
     Acquiring experience  
  
  
0.002*** 0.001* 
  
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Acquiring (Contraction) X  
     Promotion chances  
  0.00595 
  
0.252 
  (0.290) 
  
(0.305) 
Acquiring (Contraction) X  
     External leaders (same year)  
  
 
0.006 
 
-0.012 
  
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.010) 
Acquiring (Contraction) X  
     Acquiring experience  
  
  
0.004*** 0.005*** 
  
  
(0.001) (0.002) 
Firm reputation -0.027 -0.028 -0.031 -0.021 -0.026 
  (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Promotion chances -2.700 -3.748 -3.417 -2.353 -4.513 
  (3.690) (5.160) (3.674) (3.664) (5.145) 
External leadership (same year) 0.107 0.096 -0.501* 0.100 -0.205 
  (0.175) (0.178) (0.294) (0.174) (0.319) 
Acquiring experience -0.007 -0.007 -0.017 -0.138** -0.132* 
  (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.070) (0.073) 
Building strategy 0.002 0.003 0.006 -0.029 -0.022 
  (0.109) (0.109) (0.108) (0.109) (0.108) 
Leverage ratio 0.715 0.940 -0.068 2.932 -0.033 
  (9.996) (10.050) (9.958) (9.947) (9.985) 
Total attorneys 0.014 0.014 0.020 0.004 0.014 
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Constant 373.9*** 376.6*** 373.4** 383.7*** 387.0*** 
  (23.56) (25.98) (23.27) (23.33) (25.88) 
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Table 4.7: Fixed effects model of an acquiring strategy on ROS during a business cycle (2004-
2010, continued) 
  
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects (2004-2010) YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 655 655 655 655 655 
Firms 148 148 148 148 148 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.124 0.123 0.137 0.139 0.148 
Akaike Information Criterion 6124 6127 6116 6115 6112 
F-test 5.661 4.988 5.560 5.639 4.996 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01 
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Table 4.8: Fixed effects model of an acquiring strategy on ROS during a business cycle (2003-
2010) 
 
  (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) 
Acquiring (Expansion) -0.051 -0.001 -0.193** -0.132 -0.098 
  (0.066) (0.245) (0.087) (0.103) (0.263) 
Acquiring (Contraction) 0.254** 0.764* 0.145 -0.00446 0.272 
  (0.103) (0.464) (0.154) (0.180) (0.584) 
Acquiring (Expansion) X  
     Promotion chances  
  -0.0154 
  
-0.040 
  (0.085) 
  
(0.087) 
Acquiring (Expansion) X  
     External leaders (same year)  
  
 
0.006** 
 
0.005** 
  
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
Acquiring (Expansion) X  
     Acquiring experience  
  
  
0.001 0.001 
  
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Acquiring (Contraction) X  
     Promotion chances  
  -0.171 
  
-0.0779 
  (0.152) 
  
(0.168) 
Acquiring (Contraction) X  
     External leaders (same year)  
  
 
0.005 
 
0.002 
  
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
Acquiring (Contraction) X  
     Acquiring experience  
  
  
0.002* 0.00126 
  
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Firm reputation -0.018 -0.023 -0.019 -0.015 -0.021 
  (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) 
Promotion chances -0.911 0.533 -1.453 -0.879 -0.098 
  (3.194) (3.858) (3.190) (3.192) (3.883) 
External leadership (same year) -0.047 -0.037 -0.404* -0.006 -0.296 
  (0.149) (0.151) (0.209) (0.151) (0.232) 
Acquiring experience (1 year) 0.032 0.017 0.022 -0.055 -0.031 
  (0.074) (0.075) (0.074) (0.090) (0.093) 
Building strategy -0.044 -0.042 -0.037 -0.037 -0.038 
  (0.099) (0.099) (0.100) (0.099) (0.100) 
Leverage ratio -6.346 -5.581 -7.722 -6.664 -7.560 
  (8.459) (8.493) (8.457) (8.451) (8.534) 
Total attorneys 0.008 0.008 0.015 0.008 0.016 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Constant 362.2*** 357.5*** 366.0*** 390.9*** 364.4*** 
  (20.60) (21.74) (20.76) (20.46) (22.44) 
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Table 4.8: Fixed effects model of an acquiring strategy on ROS during a business cycle (2003-
2010, continued) 
 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects (2003-2010) YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 775 775 775 775 775 
Firms 148 148 148 148 148 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.103 0.103 0.110 0.106 0.107 
Akaike Information Criterion 7334 7337 7330 7334 7336 
F-test 5.363 4.838 5.162 4.986 4.288 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
This dissertation investigates how firms generate competitive advantages from their 
building and acquiring strategies. Chapter 2 assesses the comparative performance of these 
strategies by identifying four classic problems that firms may need to address in order to 
generate economic returns from their augmentation strategies. Firms pursuing building strategies 
can increase their economic returns if they also pursue their capabilities of firm reputation, 
promotion chances, and prior building experience. Firms pursuing acquiring strategies can 
increase their economic returns by having external leadership and prior acquiring experience, but 
not by offering promotion chances. 
Chapter 3 theorizes that firms providing mentorship and pursuing long-horizon 
investments are more likely to invest in building than acquiring. I find strong statistical support 
for these theories, in that when firms can provide more managerial slack to provide mentorship 
and also have financial resources to pursue long-horizon investments, these firms are more likely 
to invest in building strategies. However, I do not find statistical support for my hypotheses 
about when firms are more likely to pursue acquiring strategies. While firms that bring in more 
external leaders or are facing turnover shocks cannot provide mentorship or pursue long horizon 
investments, these firms still bring in a proportionately significant number of novice employees. 
This seemingly counterintuitive findings suggest not only that novice employees and their HC 
are heterogeneous and that controlling for their abilities is an important empirical consideration 
(Hitt, et al., 2001), but also that some novice employees may be of such high levels that they 
may be seen by the firm as essentially in the same category as experienced employees (Rynes, et 
al., 1997).  
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Chapter 4 extends the work of Chapter 2 by considering the impact of business cycle-
driven employee search frictions on building and acquiring strategies. Firms can generate more 
economic returns by pursuing building in an early contraction stage than by doing so in an early 
expansion stage because of higher employee search frictions. However, firms that pursue 
building during early expansion stages can also generate positive economic returns by pursuing 
their capabilities of promotion chances. Similarly, acquiring strategies generate positive 
economic returns to the firm in a contraction stage more so than in an expansion stage. Firms 
pursuing acquiring strategies in expansion stages can generate economic returns by having 
external leadership. 
 In conclusion, managers that are deciding to augment their firm’s HC may benefit from 
the analysis in Chapter 3 that identifies which capabilities are essential in order to effectively 
pursue building and acquiring strategies. Once augmentation strategies are chosen, then in order 
to generate value from these strategies, the analyses in Chapter 2 and 4 can shed light on the 
problems that may arise and also suggest ways to address them. There are also several possible 
areas of future research. 
In a review that incorporates both, the HR and strategy literature on human capital, 
Wright, Coff, and Moliterno (2014) identify six issues that offer opportunities for additional 
research in strategic HC. Interestingly, my dissertation work seems to fall under the fourth issue, 
and the other five are rich areas for potential extensions of my dissertation. One of the issues the 
paper raises is what are the different characteristics of HC? While I focus on the two most 
common characteristics of HC augmentation—building and acquiring—there are other 
characterizations of augmentation, i.e., temporary hires, contract workers, part-time workers, 
senior-level HC, and summer interns (Lepak & Snell, 1999). In addition to these, I can also 
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broadly study other aspects and potentially overlapping categories of HC (Hatch & Dyer, 2004), 
e.g., existing HC, mobility, recruitment, retention, succession, and turnover.  
The second issue raised is what are the different levels of analysis that characterize HC? 
As Wright, Coff, and Moliterno (2014) also recommend, I chose to study individual employees 
as my “elementary” unit of analysis—aggregated to the firm-level—and its subsequent impact on 
firm-level outcomes. However, strategic HC is a multi-level construct that offers many avenues 
for inquiry, and my legal database can possibly accommodate at least some of these additional 
levels. Third, the paper brings up the importance of reaching some level of consensus regarding 
the conceptualization of “strategic” HC. Similarly to the paper’s initial suggestions, I also define 
strategic HC as having to do with firm-level performance and outcomes of HC strategies and 
practices, however, I and other researchers can explore other manifestations of these questions 
regarding the definition of strategic HC in future work.  
Fourth, Wright, Coff, and Moliterno (2014) point to the issue of the HC investments, e.g., 
why firms decide on certain HC investments. My dissertation attempts to address some of these 
questions regarding firms’ HC investments (i.e., Chapters 2 and 4) and firms’ decision-making 
processes regarding these investments (i.e., Chapter 3). Fifth, the paper mentions firm-specific 
HC and its connection to value creation. While the second classic problem of my second chapter 
identifies and briefly explains the problem of firm-specific investments and governance 
mechanisms (Wang, et al., 2009), my research into this area can be further expanded, e.g., by 
using a more finely-grained measurement of firm-specific HC.  
Finally, Wright, Coff, and Moliterno (2014) ask who appropriates the value generated by 
HC (Coff, 1999), i.e., how is the value divided between firms and their employees? A priori, 
understanding who reaps what proportions of the value created is a challenging empirical puzzle, 
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but nonetheless, one worth attempting to resolve. One way to address this empirical challenge 
would be to use different employee billing rates to gains some insight into these proportions. 
Another area of research that the paper notes is the use of rival firms’ performance as a reference 
point to understand how long a given competitive advantage may be sustained over time.  
The four classic HC problems that were discussed throughout my dissertation matter 
differentially in various industries and job functions, in which case some problems may be more 
or less relevant (Lepak & Snell, 2002). As mentioned earlier, in industries such as professional 
sports, academia, or high-tech in which the core employees are scientists or engineers who 
publish research papers and apply for patents, individual performance is visible and thus quality 
uncertainty is less of an issue. Other types of employees within these industries who, for 
example, were brought in to perform clerical work may not need to be motivated; they may 
already be inherently motivated since many potential qualified replacements for their job are 
available. Highly skilled employees will more likely be rewarded for investing in firm-specific 
HC, whereas in the case of clerical workers, investing in firm-specific HC may not even matter 
or warrant rewards. Applying the same logic, complementarities would matter more in teams 
working on a complex consulting or IT project as opposed to those working in a call center. 
These four classic problems are important in service and labor intensive industries, but they may 
also matter in capital intensive industries if there is a service component associated with them. I 
plan to explore these and other rich opportunities for future research that are opened up by my 
dissertation. 
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Appendix A: An analysis of building and acquiring strategies in the legal industry 
Fifty years ago, as was the general norm for most industries, law firms primarily pursued 
building strategies. “Hiring of top law graduates soon after their graduation was one of the 
building blocks for the big firm” (Galanter & Palay, 1991:24). The building norm began as early 
as the twentieth century when many law firms started to grow beyond the individual 
entrepreneurial firms that previously dominated and moved to a structured tournament model: 
the Cravath system. The Cravath system “enabled lawyers with no kinship ties with one another 
to work together cooperatively, share risk, and scale operations to address the legal needs of 
complex business enterprises” (Henderson, 2010: 76).  
Firms that adopted this system were able to grow substantially, leading to the 
establishment of “big” law firms (Galanter & Palay, 1991). As part of the tournament-based 
Cravath system, firms invested in the development of elite junior lawyers, concluding with an 
“up-or-out” promotional system (Galanter & Palay, 1991). At the end of the development period, 
firms would either promote those junior associates that were well-developed and part of growing 
practice areas (up), or dismiss them (out) (Malos & Campion, 1995). Associates who had to 
leave the large law firm either went to smaller law firms, joined corporate legal departments, or 
started their own law firms, but they were generally not laterally hired by other large law firms 
(Kimball, 2006). 
Acquiring strategies were not widely pursued prior to the 1970s for several reasons 
(Shah, 2005). First, it was discouraged under the Cravath system because many experienced 
associates may have acquired habits inconsistent with the Cravath method of enculturation that 
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would threaten the potential hiring firm’s culture.30 Second, most practicing lawyers considered 
it unprofessional to “poach” personnel from other law firms (Gardner, et al., 2010; Shah, 2005). 
Third, as applies today, adverse selection problems existed (Akerlof, 1970) in that hiring firms 
may have questioned the motivations and value of potential lateral hires, who could later turn out 
to be lemons. The norm of large law firms was the same towards partners, in that these firms 
relied on building strategies when filling vacancies at the partner level (Wholey, 1985). 
The breakdown of the “no lateral hiring norm” did not begin until about thirty years ago. 
During that time, acquiring strategies became more accepted, especially during expansion stages 
in the business cycle. For example, between 1974 and 1990, acquiring of associates among 
Chicago law firms increased almost three-fold (Shah, 2005). Three reasons have largely been 
posited as potential explanations for this increase in lateral associate hiring: institutional changes 
that favored lawyer mobility, increases in demand for legal services, and purposive actions by 
law firms.  
Part of the shift to lateral hiring may have been due to institutional changes prompted by 
the American Bar Association (ABA) committees (Hillman, 1997; Shah, 2005; Stroud, 2002). In 
1961, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Opinion 300, 
prohibited non-compete agreements in law firms (Hillman, 1997). Lawyers were allowed to 
move to other law firms and less likely to be reprimanded for earning a living doing what they 
were trained to do. Then in 1968, the ABA committee issued Formal Ethics Opinion 320 that 
recognized the personal and professional relationship between lawyers and their clients, and 
would not condone practices that could interfere with these relationships (Hillman, 1997). Even 
30 While culture affected the strategies differentially under the Cravath system, this is less of a distinguishing factor 
between the augmentation strategies under the present circumstances. 
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if a lawyer is an associate or partner at a law firm, it does not affect these lawyer-client 
relationships, so long as the lawyer is selected by and is directly responsible to the client. Thus, 
clients were able to choose lawyers, rather than firms. Law firms risk losing their clients to a 
lawyer, who maintains strong relationships with their clients. The lawyer-client relationship is 
portable between firms if a lawyer decided to move to another law firm (Somaya, et al., 2008). 
Another driving force of the increase in lateral hiring during the 1980s was the increase 
in client demand for legal services. This resulted in tremendous growth for the large law firm, 
which entered more practice areas and opened more offices (Kimball, 2006). These law firms 
that previously operated out of a single large office began opening branch offices across the 
nation, often serving new clients or co-locating near their existing clients. Firms’ demand for 
lawyers increased dramatically, but the supply of law graduates remained relatively steady. “The 
growing scarcity of graduates from prestigious law schools, the traditional recruitment pool of 
the larger law firms…likely created pressure on law firms to hire associate lawyers from 
competitor firms, as well as from a broader selection of law schools” (Shah, 2005: 16). Since 
these new practice areas and branch offices needed to be staffed and the supply of lawyers was 
limited, firms began, among other strategies, raiding other law firms for partners and associates; 
during this time, acquiring strategies were more successful than building strategies (Kor & 
Leblebici, 2005). Even if a firm generally preferred to build, if it entered an expansion period, it 
would likely pursue acquiring strategies (Kimball, 2006). However, once the expansion period 
ceased, firms would likely revert back to their building strategies. 
The emergence of large law firms along with Shah’s (2005) “endogenous dynamics” led 
to the pursuit of acquiring strategies. During this time, firms that may have pursued acquiring 
previously, for growth-related reasons, had a premise that gave them the privilege to 
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subsequently adopt this practice when needed (Shah, 2005). However, the competitive 
interaction among firms accelerated the breakdown of this norm (Shah, 2005). Law firms would 
pursue acquiring strategies to recover from the loss of their HC to other firms (Gardner, 2005). 
This purposive action by law firms, combined with the need to add talent to sustain the growth of 
law firms and the changes made by the ABA committee, together contributed to the vast increase 
in acquiring strategies, and the no-lateral hiring norm was generally abandoned. 
The new “age of lawyer mobility” has moved law firms away from the traditional 
tournament model, and restructured them as an elastic tournament (Galanter & Henderson, 2008; 
Gilson & Mnookin, 1989; Henderson & Bierman, 2009). Under the elastic tournament, a firm 
“promotes, laterally hires, or de-equitizes partners in order to maximize [its] profits for a 
proportionately smaller equity class” (Galanter & Henderson, 2008: 1906). One of the trends 
from this new structure is that large law firms are valuing acquiring strategies to relatively the 
same degree as building strategies (see Figure A.1), if not more so (Kimball, 2006). This trend is 
more in line with professional service firms, which, on average, pursue more acquiring than 
building strategies (Lepak & Snell, 2002; von Nordenflycht, 2010; Wholey, 1985), because 
employees’ knowledge assets can often be taken with them to other firms (Coff, 1997). The 
ABA has continued to reduce any potential hurdles law firms face in pursuing acquiring 
strategies, such as Recommendation 109 allowing law firms to hire lawyers with conflicts of 
interest and no longer requiring client consent when a lawyer changes firms (Qualters, 2009). 
However, discussions on law firms’ perception of associates when pursuing these two HC 
strategies have fallen short because they have neglected to account for critical decision-making 
factors that would otherwise differentiate these two strategies. 
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Previous arguments do not have strong foundations, often leaving out important factors in 
decision-making, and do not discuss the uniqueness of each strategy. For example, Manch (2000) 
describes how novice associates have stronger academic credentials than potential lateral 
associates, but does not provide support for this claim. Manch (2000) also leaves out the fact that 
these laterals were the talented pool of novice candidates, i.e., the top half of the top 20 law 
schools that large law firms typically draw from. In another case, Manch (2000) explains that 
novice associates are often loyal to their first law firm, but also counters this claim by 
mentioning that they may make employment decisions for the wrong reasons and thus are more 
likely to leave.  
Further, Manch (2000) explains that lateral associates are likely to stay at their new law 
firm if it is better fit for them, but does not explain how this is unique to acquiring strategies 
only. Novice associates that choose a firm that is a better fit for them would seem likely to 
remain at that firm as well. Finally, Manch (2000) suggests that since lateral associates know 
more about themselves, they are likely to choose employers that fit their personality and align 
better with their goals, and thus are more likely to stay at their new firm than novice associates. 
However, this logic contradicts a NALP study that finds that lateral associates are 30% more 
likely to leave their firm than entry-level associates (Goldberg, 2007). 
The cost of building or acquiring in the legal industry does not offer a definitive solution 
to the decision either. In general, novice associates are paid less than lateral associates (Bidwell, 
2011; Goldberg, 2007). In recent years, novice associates have become so coveted that their 
starting salaries have doubled in the last ten years from $70k to $140k, however, because of the 
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lockstep compensation system,31 lateral associates are paid even higher wages. In addition, law 
firms have to pay recruiting fees of as much as $50k when bringing in a lateral associate 
(Kimball, 2006). However, hiring costs are only one part of a larger building strategy. Novice 
associates also have substantial training and development costs (Goldberg, 2007). Therefore, in 
looking at the total costs of these two HC strategies, both can be equally expensive. 
In conclusion, the pursuit of building and acquiring strategies in the legal industry has 
changed over time. Initially, law firms only pursued building, then they gradually started to 
adopt acquiring to a limited degree, and now employ both building and acquiring strategies in 
relatively equal degrees. Drawing from the National Association for Legal Placement (NALP), 
as shown in Figure A.1, the hiring of novice and lateral associate lawyers from 1999-2008 has 
been relatively equal, barring a couple business cycle-related bumps. Past literature and research 
articles have unevenly explained current trends, and therefore, this dissertation is needed to shed 
light on these HC augmentation practices.   
31 Under a lockstep compensation system that is characteristic of law firms, lawyer salaries are purely based on a 
lawyer’s seniority in the law firm, since this reduces intra-firm competition and encourages teamwork among 
lawyers (Gilson & Mnookin, 1985).  
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Figure A.1: The extent law firms practiced building and acquiring strategies 
 
Years 2009-2013 were not shown because data were not fully available. Law firms were 
impacted by the 2009 recession that drastically reduced augmentation and many firms did not 
report the number of associates hired using each strategy. However, upon further analysis, I posit 
the percent of novice to total associate hiring remained relatively stable. 
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Appendix B: Construction of dataset 
This dissertation uses a firm-level panel dataset from the legal industry to assess the 
impact of HC augmentation strategies on a firm’s economic returns. I constructed a large dataset 
by combining a number of different surveys of the largest U. S. law firms, which includes all 
firms in both the Am Law 200 published by the American Lawyer and the NLJ 250 published by 
the National Law Journal. Am Law 200 annually ranks the top 200 revenue grossing law firms 
that self-report their revenue and net income, which is cross-checked by the American Lawyer’s 
staff reporters. NLJ 250 ranks the largest 250 law firms based on the total number of permanent 
full-time equivalent attorneys. In order to qualify, a firm must employ more lawyers in the U.S. 
than in any other country. The report comes out in November of the same year however it covers 
the period from January 1st to December 31st with a firm projecting their counts for the last two 
months.  
A total of 476 unique firms were in either the Am Law 200 or the NLJ 250 over the time 
frame. Seventy-seven of these firms were previously involved in a merger or acquisition and 
therefore re-coded as a new firm following the merger because of the drastic changes in hiring 
patterns that generally results. After merging the Am Law 200 data with the NLJ 250 data, 169 
firms were dropped because they were not listed in both surveys. Since the Am Law 200 survey 
comes out almost eight months after the NLJ 250, eight firm-year observations among the 
merged firms were removed because in one survey only the merged firm is listed while in the 
other survey, these firms are listed separately.  
The NLJ Staffing survey and Mid-level Satisfaction survey, which contain the core data 
necessary for measuring HC strategies and hypotheses, was then added to the dataset. This 
addition resulted in an additional drop of 161 firms because many firms did not voluntarily 
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report their staffing or satisfaction numbers. The largest number of missing values was in 2009, 
following the recession that resulted in less hiring of associates across firms. Also, I removed 
one firm from the sample because of very large attorney hiring counts that can skew the results. I 
lagged the independent variables to reduce endogeneity concerns, but this resulted in some years 
of data dropping out. The final sample for Chapters 2 and 4 consisted of 148 firms from all four 
surveys observed longitudinally. Since Chapter 3 had additional control variables, some of which 
all 148 firms did not report, i.e., 22 firms did not report their associate turnover ratio, the number 
of firms in this analysis was reduced to 126 firms observed longitudinally.  
Since HC augmentation is our core variable of interest, I discuss important trends of this 
variable in my sample of law firms. Figures B.1 and B.2 show the extent to which law firms in 
my database pursued each HC augmentation strategy from 2002-2011. Overall, law firms 
pursued building more than acquiring, and building trends were more stable each year than 
acquiring trends. Acquiring aligns more with the business cycle, in which hiring rises during the 
expansion years, and drops during the contraction years. Figure B.3 shows how law firms 
balanced building and acquiring for all years in the sample. Most law firms lie in the center of 
the graph, suggesting Cappelli’s (2008:13) recommendation on “striking a balance” is an 
important strategy for augmentation, since these firms often pursue a mix of both HC strategies 
each year. 
There are several limitations of this dataset. First, I use self-reported data on law firms, 
and therefore, excluded firms that did not report data. These excluded firms may have been 
unsuccessful in their augmentation strategies, which, if reported, would have negatively 
impacted performance. These firms may have chosen not to answer questions related to 
augmentation, and therefore, my results may overstate the positive findings of the studies. 
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However, in a separate analysis comparing the performance of firms that reported building and 
acquiring data to those that did not report the data, there was no significant difference between 
such firms, suggesting that the findings of my chapters are robust. Second, in this study, there are 
omitted variables, such as practice areas, which I use fixed effects to control for assuming it is a 
time invariant variable. However, if firms are adding new practices areas depending on the stages 
of the business cycle, then this may impact the findings in my chapters. Finally, I aggregate the 
individual augmentation decisions to represent the firm, and group the individual firms to 
identify trends. This aggregation may be incorrect since the level of analysis is the vacancy level 
and not firm-level. Aside from the limitations, the core contribution of this dissertation is the 
measurement of building and acquiring strategies, which up until now has been an empirical 
challenge. I plan to leverage this dataset to address additional augmentation questions that 
scholars and managers have not been able to work on due to the lack of such rich data. 
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Figure B.1: Trends of law firms practicing each HC augmentation strategy  
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Figure B.2: Average revenue per lawyer and average number of associates per firm across a  
 business cycle 
 
 
 
*There were significantly fewer responses to the NLJ staffing survey in 2011, especially in 
regards to firms’ acquiring strategies.  
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Figure B.3: Augmentation strategies by law firm from 2002 to 2011 
 
 
- Building represents the number of entry-level associates a law firm hires. 
- Acquiring represents the number of lateral mid-level associates a law firm hires. 
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